Hormuz Is Not Back: Shipping Traffic Rises, Then Stalls, as the Iran-U.S. MoU Faces Its First Real Test
Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has improved from crisis lows but remains far below pre-war levels. The MoU opened a corridor, not a settlement.
The Strait of Hormuz is open, but not normal. That distinction may decide whether the U.S.-Iran memorandum survives. Maritime data over recent days shows traffic recovering from the darkest days of the war, when some counts dropped to only a handful of daily crossings. But even after the Switzerland MoU, reported crossings remain nowhere near the pre-war rhythm of more than 130 to 150 vessels per day.
That is why “reopened” can be misleading. A door can be technically open while most people are still afraid to walk through it. Shipowners, insurers, charterers, oil companies and captains do not judge risk from press conferences. They judge it from drone attacks, naval warnings, insurance premiums, route guidance, satellite data and whether previous vessels were allowed through safely.
The MoU appears to have improved traffic from crisis lows, with crossings rising into the teens or twenties on some days. But recent attacks and counterstrikes have pushed traffic back toward wartime levels. If reports of 15 to 20 daily crossings are accurate, the strait is functioning at a fraction of its former capacity. That matters because Hormuz is not just a symbolic chokepoint. It is one of the central arteries of the global energy system.
Markets have been strangely calm at times, even after new incidents. Brent moving down after an attack does not mean the danger disappeared. It may mean traders believe the disruption is contained, strategic reserves can cushion the shock, or that both Iran and the United States are calibrating violence below the level that truly closes the strait. But markets can be arrogant. Shipping risk can change faster than oil screens.
The central dispute is control. Iran argues that it has security authority over traffic arrangements, especially near Iranian-controlled routes. The United States insists on freedom of navigation and rejects any system that gives the IRGC effective veto power over commercial shipping. Oman’s route has become crucial because many non-Iranian, non-sanctioned vessels may prefer or need to avoid Iranian-controlled channels.
The MoU may have stopped the collapse. It has not yet rebuilt the system. Every ship that passes is a vote of confidence. Every ship that reroutes, waits or cancels is a vote of no confidence.