Pezeshkian's Missile Line: Why Iran Says It Would Be 'Plowed Like Gaza' Without Deterrence
Iran’s president says missiles are non-negotiable because without them Israel and America would treat Iran like Gaza. Is this defensive logic — or a permanent obstacle to peace?
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has drawn a red line through the heart of the U.S.-Iran peace process: missiles are not on the table.
His argument is blunt. If Iran did not have missiles, he said, Israel and America would have “plowed” through Iran the way Gaza was plowed through, showing no mercy to the old or the young. Tehran, he added, will never negotiate away its defensive capabilities.
This is not a side comment. It may be the central obstacle to the next phase of diplomacy. For Washington, the ideal final agreement would not only limit Iran’s nuclear program. It would also reduce the threat posed by Iran’s ballistic missiles, drones and regional networks. For Israel, missiles are not a separate issue from the nuclear file. They are the delivery system, the deterrent, and the reason Israeli civilians and military sites remain vulnerable even when air superiority belongs to Israel and the United States.
For Iran, however, the missile program is the lesson of the war. Tehran believes missiles prevented total defeat. It believes missiles forced Washington to negotiate. It believes missiles kept Israel from escalating even further. And it believes Gaza proves what happens to a population that cannot impose military costs on a stronger enemy.
That does not make Iran’s missile strategy harmless. Iran’s missile and drone arsenal has threatened shipping, bases, cities and regional stability. It gives Tehran leverage through fear. It also gives hardliners a tool to derail diplomacy whenever political compromise looks too painful. But from Tehran’s perspective, asking Iran to surrender missiles while Israel retains advanced air power, nuclear ambiguity, U.S. backing and regional strike freedom is not disarmament. It is strategic suicide.
This is the dilemma at the core of modern arms talks. One side calls a weapon “defensive” because it prevents invasion. The other calls the same weapon “offensive” because it can strike cities. Both can be partly right.
The United States now faces a sequencing problem. If it demands missile limits too early, Iran may walk away. If it ignores missiles completely, Israel, Gulf states and U.S. hawks will say the agreement is dangerously incomplete. If it tries to separate nuclear talks from missile talks, it may win a temporary pause while leaving the next crisis untouched.
Israel will see Pezeshkian’s statement as confirmation that Iran has no intention of becoming a normal state actor. The Iranian counterargument is equally simple: Israel wants Iran disarmed because Israel wants freedom to strike without consequence.
The open question is whether diplomacy can survive this contradiction. A narrow deal may freeze nuclear escalation and reopen trade while leaving the missile question for later. A broader deal may be impossible. A failed deal may return the region to war after all sides use the pause to reload.