Washington’s Libya Gamble Could Fuel Sudan’s War: The Haftar-Hemedti Connection Nobody Wants to Own
U.S. outreach to eastern Libya’s Haftar family may stabilize one map while destabilizing another. Sudan’s RSF has long benefited from rear networks across Libya’s south.
Washington’s renewed engagement with eastern Libya’s Haftar network may look like pragmatic diplomacy on one map. On another map, it may look like oxygen for Sudan’s war.
The problem is geography. Eastern and southern Libya are not isolated from Sudan’s conflict. The al-Kufrah region and surrounding desert corridors have long been discussed as part of the logistical rear environment through which Sudanese armed actors, smugglers, mercenaries and weapons networks move. The Rapid Support Forces, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, have relied on external routes and patrons to sustain their war against the Sudanese Armed Forces. Libya’s Haftar-controlled territory sits uncomfortably close to that ecosystem.
The Arab Weekly and other regional analysts have warned that Washington’s embrace of the Haftar family could encourage Hemedti, not only by offering a political model but by stabilizing territory that functions as a rear base for RSF logistics. That is a serious charge, and it must be handled carefully. It does not mean the United States is intentionally backing the RSF. It means that one policy objective — stabilizing Libya through engagement with powerful eastern actors — may collide with another objective: ending Sudan’s catastrophic war.
This is the curse of transactional diplomacy. The U.S. may look at Libya and see migration control, energy infrastructure, counterterrorism access and a divided state where ignoring Haftar is unrealistic. But Sudanese civilians may see something else: foreign powers legitimizing warlord networks that overlap with the supply chains killing them.
The Haftar-Hemedti comparison is uncomfortable because both men built power around armed networks, territory, resources and foreign patrons. Both became indispensable by making themselves difficult to bypass. Both show how weak states can produce military entrepreneurs who then become political facts.
Supporters of U.S. engagement with the Haftars would argue that isolation failed. Libya remains divided, armed groups remain powerful, and diplomacy must deal with reality. If Washington wants influence over eastern Libya, it must speak to those who control it. Engagement is not endorsement, they would say. It is leverage.
Critics answer that Washington often calls engagement “leverage” when it is really recognition. Once a warlord becomes a formal partner, the costs of confronting him rise. If eastern Libya remains a permissive environment for RSF-linked networks, then U.S. policy risks looking like it is stabilizing the wrong people.
The Sudan war has already produced one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters. El-Fasher, El-Obeid, Darfur and other fronts have shown how quickly military pressure can turn into mass displacement, hunger and atrocity risk. In that context, any external corridor matters. Every base, border crossing, airfield and desert road is part of the war.
The headline says Washington is gambling in Libya. The deeper question is whether U.S. diplomacy can see across borders. Stabilizing eastern Libya while Sudan burns next door may not be stability at all. It may be moving the fire from one room to another and calling the hallway secure.