Can Scott Bessent Shut Every Iranian Airline Worldwide? The September 23 Sanctions Threat Explained
Washington cannot literally close foreign airlines everywhere, but it can threaten fuel suppliers, airports, ticket agents and banks with exclusion from dollar finance.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent says Iranian airlines will be shut down “worldwide” from Wednesday, September 23, as Operation Economic Outcast moves from banking and oil into civilian aviation.
The word “worldwide” describes Washington’s ambition, not a legal power to close every airline on Earth. The United States does not control foreign airspace or airport licenses. Its leverage comes from secondary sanctions: companies that fuel, insure, repair, handle, finance or sell tickets for Iranian carriers can be threatened with loss of access to the U.S. financial system.
That pressure is formidable. International airlines depend on dollar payments, global reservation networks, aircraft parts, insurance and service contractors. An airport may legally permit an Iranian flight but find that no supplier is willing to refuel it. A travel agent may stop selling tickets because its bank rejects the transaction. Sanctions can therefore ground aircraft without an American official closing the runway.
Iranian aviation was already fragile. The Financial Times reported that Mahan Air suspended routes to Istanbul, Ankara and Muscat as sanctions reached ground-service and sales networks. Iran Air reportedly had only a small number of operational aircraft, reflecting decades of restricted access to parts and new planes. War damage and airspace risk add further constraints.
Iraq’s reported decision to suspend sanctioned Iranian airlines would be particularly significant. The two countries have dense religious, commercial and family travel. Baghdad also balances close economic ties with Tehran against dependence on dollar access and U.S. sanctions waivers. The exact Iraqi order must show which carriers, routes and dates are covered; a targeted suspension is not necessarily a ban on all Iranian aviation.
Washington argues that airlines and support companies have assisted the IRGC and military logistics. Iran says aviation sanctions punish civilians, isolate families and undermine flight safety. Both claims require separating specific carriers and conduct. An airline designated for weapons transport presents a different case from restrictions that block medical, educational or ordinary passenger travel.
Enforcement will vary. Russia, China and some regional states may keep routes open or create alternative payment arrangements. They still face insurance, spare-parts and international-airport exposure. Complete isolation is unlikely, but a sharp contraction in destinations is plausible.
Safety is the uncomfortable issue. Preventing parts and maintenance access can reduce military logistics while increasing risks for civilian passengers on aging aircraft. Humanitarian licenses exist, yet suppliers often over-comply because penalties are severe and rules complex.
The September 23 deadline is also psychological. Treasury wants service providers to withdraw before it brings cases. The announcement itself can achieve much of the effect.
The legal machinery will likely combine existing designations with new warnings rather than create a single universal aviation prohibition. OFAC can designate carriers and executives, freeze property touching U.S. jurisdiction and threaten foreign institutions that conduct significant transactions. Export controls can restrict American-origin components even when they are held by third-country firms. Visa measures and criminal cases can add personal pressure.
Yet enforcement has limits. Aircraft can be re-registered, wet-leased or operated through intermediaries. Tickets can be sold outside major reservation platforms, and governments willing to absorb sanctions risk can provide fuel. Such workarounds are costly, reduce schedules and may be unsafe, but they prevent “worldwide shutdown” from being literal.
The humanitarian line will be contested. Washington can issue licenses for emergency parts and humanitarian travel, while Tehran may prioritize politically valuable routes. Measuring the policy requires more than counting canceled flights: journalists should track medical evacuations, diaspora travel, accident risk and whether military logistics actually decline.
There may also be a negotiation objective behind maximum pressure. By making connectivity scarce, Washington increases the value of sanctions relief it could later offer. Tehran sees the same mechanism as collective coercion and may respond through reciprocal restrictions, cyber activity or pressure on regional transport.
What to watch next
Which airlines and service companies appear in the formal sanctions notice? Does Iraq publish a carrier-specific ban? Do China, Russia or Gulf airports continue accepting flights? Bessent cannot flip a switch that closes every Iranian airline worldwide. He can make the commercial cost of serving them so high that much of the network stops voluntarily—and that may be nearly as effective.