Colombia’s New ‘El Tigre’ President Wants U.S. Forces Against Cartels: Security Revolution—or Sovereignty Crisis?
The Trump administration says Colombia’s new president Abelardo de la Espriella has requested U.S. collaboration in joint military operations against narco-terrorist groups. The request marks a dramatic break from Gustavo Petro’s approach and is already triggering constitutional and sovereignty disputes.
Colombia’s new president, Abelardo de la Espriella, is asking the United States for direct military collaboration against armed drug-trafficking organisations.
U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth publicly announced the request at a regional counter-cartel meeting in Panama.
Associated Press says the Colombian government has joined the U.S.-led Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition and is seeking joint operations against what Washington calls narco-terrorist networks.
The move is a dramatic strategic change.
Former president Gustavo Petro argued that the drug war had failed and strongly resisted unilateral U.S. military intervention.
De la Espriella—nicknamed “El Tigre”—campaigned on restoring a hard security relationship with Washington and Israel.
He is now acting on that promise.
The first question is what “joint military operations” actually means.
It could mean intelligence sharing, surveillance aircraft, special-forces training, logistics and targeting support.
It could also mean U.S. troops, aircraft or drones directly participating in lethal operations on Colombian territory.
Those are very different levels of intervention.
Neither Bogotá nor Washington has yet provided a detailed public operational framework.
That ambiguity is already producing a constitutional dispute inside Colombia.
Critics argue the president cannot simply authorise foreign troops to operate in the country without legislative or judicial approval.
Colombia’s constitution gives the Senate an important role in permitting the transit of foreign troops.
Supporters of the government may argue that temporary cooperation under existing security agreements does not necessarily require the same process as a permanent foreign base.
Courts may eventually have to decide where the line lies.
The political symbolism is enormous.
For decades, Colombia was Washington’s closest military partner in South America.
Plan Colombia provided billions of dollars in training, intelligence, aircraft and counternarcotics support.
The programme helped weaken the FARC and improve state security in many regions.
It also became associated with human-rights abuses, displacement and a drug economy that adapted rather than disappearing.
The new coalition risks reopening the same debate at a more aggressive level.
The Trump administration has increasingly designated cartels and armed criminal organisations as terrorists.
That matters legally and rhetorically.
A trafficker can be arrested and prosecuted.
A terrorist enemy is more easily framed as a military target.
Washington has already conducted lethal maritime operations against vessels it says were transporting narcotics.
Rights groups have questioned whether all people killed were legitimate military targets.
The United States disputes those criticisms.
Colombia has a more complicated battlefield than the Caribbean.
The ELN is an insurgent organisation with political structures and territorial control.
FARC dissident groups vary widely.
Some are primarily criminal.
Others retain ideological and guerrilla characteristics.
Drug-trafficking networks overlap with local communities, illegal mining, armed protection and rural economies.
A missile or special-forces raid can kill a commander.
It cannot automatically replace the economic system that allowed the commander to recruit.
That does not make military operations useless.
Some regions of Colombia face severe violence and state absence.
Residents may strongly support aggressive action against groups that extort, kidnap and control roads.
The challenge is intelligence.
If the U.S. becomes directly involved in strikes, a mistaken target can become a national political crisis.
The sovereignty question also extends beyond Colombia.
Washington is building a hemispheric coalition designed to treat transnational criminal networks more like military adversaries.
If Colombia, historically the region’s most experienced counterinsurgency state, embraces that model, other governments may follow.
The open question is whether de la Espriella has found a way to combine U.S. military power with Colombian knowledge to dismantle entrenched armed groups—or whether the country is entering another cycle in which foreign firepower promises a decisive end to the drug war and instead produces a new generation of political, legal and human costs.