Yemen’s Tribes Prepare a ‘March on al-Hazm’: Is the Great Battle for al-Jawf About to Begin?
Sheikh Hamad bin Fadgham has called on anti-Houthi tribal forces to advance toward Munqidhah ahead of a possible march on al-Hazm, the Houthi-held capital of al-Jawf. Local mobilisation is visible, but whether the tribes possess the command, weapons and external support for a sustained offensive remains uncertain.
Sheikh Hamad bin Fadgham has called on tribal forces aligned with Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council to move toward Munqidhah in preparation for what he described as a march on al-Hazm.
Al-Hazm is the capital of al-Jawf Governorate and is controlled by Ansarullah, commonly known as the Houthis.
Bin Fadgham described the mobilisation as preparation for the “Great Battle.”
Local reports and videos show large movements of armed tribesmen toward front-line areas. Fighting has also continued around al-Yatmah, where pro-PLC tribal coalitions have clashed with tribes supporting Ansarullah.
These reports indicate real mobilisation. They do not yet prove that a coordinated offensive on al-Hazm has begun.
Tribal gatherings can serve several purposes simultaneously. They can pressure Houthi authorities during negotiations, demonstrate solidarity after killings, defend local territory or form the first stage of a wider military campaign.
The movement in al-Jawf began with local grievances.
Tensions escalated after disputes involving arrests, checkpoint incidents and allegations that Houthi forces killed or mistreated tribal figures. The detention and treatment of Sheikh Hamad bin Fadgham became a rallying point for tribes around al-Rayyan.
Later clashes reportedly followed the killing of members of the al-Wahas tribe at an Ansarullah checkpoint. These events transformed local anger into a broader anti-Houthi mobilisation.
The Presidential Leadership Council and Saudi Arabia may now see an opportunity.
Al-Jawf lies near Marib, Saudi Arabia and important routes connecting northern Yemen. Pressure there could force the Houthis to move fighters away from missile sites, Red Sea positions and other active fronts.
A march toward al-Hazm would carry symbolic and strategic value. The city functions as the provincial administrative centre and a transport hub. Capturing it would challenge Houthi control over northeastern Yemen and create a major political victory for the recognised government.
The terrain and military balance make that objective difficult.
Tribal fighters know local routes and can mobilise rapidly. They may lack the heavy weapons, logistics, medical support and unified command required to seize and hold a defended provincial capital.
Ansarullah has years of experience fighting tribal and government forces. It can deploy reinforcements, drones, artillery and security units while using checkpoints and detention to disrupt mobilisation.
The Houthis may also attempt negotiation before a major battle. Tribal mediation remains an important institution in Yemen. Compensation, prisoner releases, guarantees and recognition of local rights can halt fighting even after casualties.
The language of a “Great Battle” makes compromise politically harder. Once leaders promise a march on the capital, a negotiated pause can be portrayed as weakness.
External involvement will be decisive.
Saudi air support, intelligence and weapons could transform a tribal advance into a serious offensive. Without that support, the movement may remain local.
Saudi Arabia has reasons to increase pressure after Houthi attacks on shipping and Saudi infrastructure. It also remembers the enormous cost of its previous Yemen campaign.
The PLC itself is divided. Its forces include tribal coalitions, government units, Saudi-backed formations and Southern Transitional Council troops with different priorities.
The strongest evidence currently shows movement, clashes and public calls for advance. Claims that al-Hazm is about to fall would be premature.
Observers should watch for artillery deployment, armoured vehicles, sustained supply convoys, Saudi aircraft and formal announcements from recognised government forces.
The open question is whether Sheikh Hamad bin Fadgham has assembled enough tribal anger to challenge Houthi rule—or whether the promise of a march on al-Hazm will collapse when local forces meet the realities of a fortified war.