Iran and Every Gulf Arab State Head to Muscat—Could One Room Reopen Hormuz and Defuse the Wider War?
Oman is seeking a Monday meeting between Iran’s foreign minister and all six GCC counterparts as attacks threaten Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and Saudi energy infrastructure. The gathering could build a maritime deal—or expose how divided the Gulf remains.
Oman is preparing what could become the most important regional meeting of the Iran war: the foreign ministers of all six Gulf Arab states in one room with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Muscat. The reported Monday gathering is intended to address maritime security and possible arrangements around the Strait of Hormuz. It is planned diplomacy, not yet a signed deal.
Iran's Foreign Ministry says preparations are underway for a meeting of Persian Gulf littoral states. Financial Times-linked reporting describes Oman's effort to bring the GCC ministers and Iran together. Final attendance, format and agenda had not been completely published at drafting time, so “summit” should be used carefully.
The urgency is obvious. Hormuz traffic has fallen sharply under attacks, mine threats and selective passage. Saudi Arabia's East–West Pipeline—its principal bypass—has been shut after drone strikes from Iraq. Ansarallah has captured territory around Bab el-Mandeb, threatening the Red Sea alternative.
Every government at the table has a different fear. Saudi Arabia wants attacks on energy infrastructure and vessels to stop. The UAE needs commercial routes and port confidence. Qatar protects gas exports. Kuwait and Bahrain host or cooperate with U.S. forces and worry about retaliation. Oman wants its waters and mediation role preserved. Iran wants sanctions relief, security guarantees and recognition that it cannot be excluded from the regional order.
Those interests overlap enough for a narrow agreement. Participants could establish ship-notification procedures, emergency hotlines, protected rescue zones, rules for temporary corridors and a process for investigating attacks. None requires agreement on Iran's nuclear program or on every U.S. military operation.
The hardest question is enforcement. Iran may promise safe passage if American strikes stop or a memorandum is honored. Gulf states may say navigation is an unconditional international right and refuse to trade access for political concessions. The United States is not listed as a participant but controls decisions Tehran says are central.
That absence can be a feature or a weakness. Regional states may negotiate technical measures without the public burden of direct U.S.–Iran talks. Oman can then carry messages to Washington. Conversely, Iran may be unable to guarantee restraint by Ansarallah or Iraqi militias, while Gulf ministers cannot bind the U.S. military.
Saudi Arabia's recent calls with Oman, Qatar, Iran and Pakistan suggest diplomacy is already active. Riyadh reportedly asked President Trump for strikes on the Houthis and was refused, increasing the incentive to test negotiation. Military disappointment can create diplomatic flexibility.
Trust is exceptionally low. Gulf states accuse Iran of attacking their territory and using allied groups to create deniability. Iran says U.S. bases and airspace in Arab countries enable attacks against it. Each side sees its own actions as defense and the other's as aggression.
Oman is suited to the role because it maintains channels with Iran, the United States and GCC neighbors. Its geography at Hormuz gives it a direct safety interest. Muscat has repeatedly hosted discreet talks and can propose ambiguous language that allows rivals to de-escalate without publicly surrendering.
Ambiguity, however, caused problems in earlier memoranda. One side may believe Washington promised sanctions relief while another believes Iran promised unrestricted passage. A new text needs operational details: which vessels qualify, who escorts them, what counts as a violation, how mines are cleared and what happens after an attack.
The meeting could also address Yemen. Iran supports Ansarallah but denies commanding it. Saudi Arabia backs the internationally recognized government and is considering a counteroffensive. A maritime arrangement that ignores the Houthi capture of Mayun will be incomplete; including Yemen may make agreement politically harder.
China and India will quietly support stability because both depend on Gulf energy. Modi raised freedom of navigation directly with President Pezeshkian at the BRICS summit. External consumers could offer monitoring, insurance guarantees or reconstruction incentives without joining military enforcement.
There is a risk that the gathering becomes theater: photographs, general calls for dialogue and no change at sea. Even theater can keep channels open, but markets will judge tanker movements, insurance and attacks rather than communiqués.
The most realistic outcome is an incremental mechanism, not a grand peace. A verified 72-hour passage window, shared rescue protocol or freeze on attacks against energy facilities could demonstrate that agreements work. Success could expand; failure would strengthen advocates of escalation.
What to watch next
Watch confirmed attendance, whether Yemen and Iraq join indirectly, and whether Oman publishes a written maritime framework. Do tanker transits rise before or after the meeting? Does Washington endorse the process? Can Iran guarantee restraint by aligned groups, and can Gulf states keep their territory from being used for attacks? One room in Muscat cannot solve every war—but could it create the first rule that all sides obey long enough to prevent the next one?