Iran Says Its Military Doctrine Has Shifted From Defence to Offence—and Future Retaliation Will Be Bigger
Iranian Army spokesman Brig. Gen. Mohammad Akraminia says Iran has moved toward an offensive doctrine after recent wars. He says this does not automatically mean preventive war, but future attacks will draw immediate and broader retaliation.
Iran’s army has publicly announced a shift in military doctrine that could make the next regional crisis much harder to contain.
Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia says Iran has gradually moved from a defensive posture toward an offensive one after lessons learned in recent wars.
The statement is confirmed in Iranian state reporting and international coverage.
Akraminia also clarified that the shift does not necessarily mean Iran intends to launch preventive wars. His description is closer to a doctrine of immediate and disproportionate retaliation: if Iran is attacked, the answer should come quickly and may be much larger than the original strike.
That distinction matters, but it does not remove escalation risk.
Imagine Israel strikes what it considers an imminent Iranian missile deployment. Tehran responds with a much larger barrage because its doctrine requires a broader answer. Israel interprets the Iranian barrage as a new offensive phase and strikes harder again.
Every actor can insist it is acting defensively while the conflict grows.
Akraminia also says Iran has repaired military systems damaged by U.S. and Israeli strikes and introduced new weapons into service.
There is clear evidence of rapid reconstruction. Satellite imagery shows roads, missile infrastructure and military facilities being repaired. Iran continues operating missiles, drones, naval forces and air defence.
That undermines claims that Iran’s conventional military capacity has been completely destroyed.
The stronger claim—that damaged capabilities are fully restored—is harder to verify.
Some systems can be rebuilt quickly. A road into an underground site may take days. Replacing sophisticated radar arrays, specialised industrial machinery or experienced command personnel can take much longer.
The declaration therefore serves deterrence as much as description.
Iran wants Washington and Israel to believe another limited strike will not stay limited.
That message interacts dangerously with the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials already describe the U.S. naval blockade as aggression. If Tehran defines enforcement of that blockade as the initiating attack, it can call offensive action against American forces ‘retaliation.’ Washington would see exactly the opposite.
The same event becomes defensive under one doctrine and offensive under the other.
Akraminia’s comments also show how the Iranian military views ceasefires. Diplomats describe a pause as an opportunity to negotiate. Military leaders describe it as time to repair, reload and prepare for the next round.
That does not mean all of Iran wants more war.
President Masoud Pezeshkian has openly argued that Iran should seek an end to the conflict while it retains leverage. Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf is also emphasizing economic stability and diplomacy.
Iran’s system contains competing institutional incentives. Civilian politicians worry about inflation, reconstruction and public anger. Military leaders worry about deterrence, survival and whether restraint will invite another attack.
The new doctrine can even strengthen diplomatic bargaining. Negotiators can tell Washington that refusing compromise empowers military leaders committed to larger retaliation.
There is another striking element in Akraminia’s current messaging: he has discussed financial rewards for killing or capturing American troops if the United States launches a ground incursion into Iran.
There is no announced U.S. invasion. The language appears designed to signal that any invasion would become a national resistance campaign rather than a conventional fight between armies.
The broader question is whether Iran truly changed doctrine or simply changed the name for behavior it already practiced. Tehran has promised severe retaliation for decades.
What changed in 2026 is that old thresholds collapsed. Iran and the United States attacked each other directly. Israel and Iran exchanged sustained strikes. Gulf bases became battlefield targets.
After those precedents, Iranian planners may believe a restrained response no longer deters anyone.
That makes the phrase ‘offensive doctrine’ important even if Iran insists it will not automatically strike first.
The open question is whether threatening a larger response prevents another attack—or guarantees that the next limited incident becomes a regional war because Tehran has publicly committed itself to answering harder than it was hit.