Diplomacy ·

Iran Says a Large Part of US Talks Is Concluded — But Blames Washington’s ‘Institutionalized Vacillation’

Tehran says progress has been made in the U.S. memorandum talks, but no one can claim a deal is imminent. The real obstacle may be Washington’s contradictory signals.

Iran Says a Large Part of US Talks Is Concluded — But Blames Washington’s ‘Institutionalized Vacillation’

Iran’s Foreign Ministry has delivered a carefully balanced message: yes, a large portion of the topics under discussion with the United States has reached some form of conclusion; no, that does not mean an agreement is imminent. The phrasing is important because it pushes back against market-moving leaks while keeping diplomacy alive.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said progress has been made, but warned that U.S. policymaking suffers from “institutionalized vacillation.” In his framing, Washington changes position so frequently that negotiators face different, sometimes contradictory viewpoints within hours. That, Tehran argues, disrupts any serious process.

This is both diplomacy and accusation. Iran wants to appear reasonable: we are negotiating, we have reached conclusions, we understand the importance of the waterway, and we are not the side creating chaos. At the same time, it wants to shift blame for delays onto Washington’s internal contradictions — Trump’s public threats, Rubio’s warnings, Israeli pressure, hawkish Republicans, Gulf concerns, market leaks and shifting U.S. demands.

There is some truth in the complexity. The United States is not one voice. Trump wants a spectacular deal but also threatens bigger war. Rubio talks about Plan B if Hormuz remains restricted. Israel fears the emerging framework may leave Iran too strong. Republican hardliners accuse Trump of giving away too much. Markets punish uncertainty. Gulf states push for stability. Each actor pulls the U.S. position in a different direction.

Iran is not one voice either. Tehran must balance the Foreign Ministry, the IRGC, Supreme Leader circles, parliament, public anger, economic pressure and national pride. Some want sanctions relief. Some want revenge. Some want to preserve Hormuz leverage. Some fear humiliation. Iranian officials criticize U.S. vacillation, but their own system also sends mixed signals.

The key issue is what has actually been concluded. Reports suggest progress on ceasefire language, navigation mechanisms, sanctions relief sequencing and broader memorandum structure. But the hardest questions remain: Hormuz fees or environmental taxes, frozen assets, oil sanctions, nuclear enrichment, uranium stockpiles, Lebanon, proxies and U.S. guarantees. Saying a large part is concluded may mean the easier parts are done. It may also mean the hard parts are being placed into future negotiations.

That is why “not imminent” matters. Tehran is trying to prevent the public from believing a final deal is hours away. It may also be trying to prevent markets from forcing its hand. If oil crashes on false optimism, Iran loses leverage. If domestic audiences believe a deal is complete, hardliners can attack negotiators before the text is final.

The phrase institutionalized vacillation is clever because it turns Trump’s negotiating style into a structural weakness. Trump sees unpredictability as leverage. Iran presents it as dysfunction. Both interpretations may be correct. Unpredictability can pressure an opponent, but it can also make a deal harder to close because no one knows which American position is real.

The headline says Iran confirms progress but denies imminent agreement. The deeper question is whether the U.S. and Iran are negotiating a real settlement or merely managing escalation in written form. A memorandum can pause war. It cannot solve mistrust by itself.

For now, Tehran’s message is clear: progress exists, but no one should confuse movement with signature. In the Iran war, the most dangerous moment may be when everyone thinks peace is close but no one agrees what peace means.