Bennett Blames Qatar for October 7 and Vows Enemy-State Status: Accountability—or an Election Attack on Israel’s Main Mediator?
Naftali Bennett says Qatar financed Hamas, bears responsibility for October 7 and should be designated an enemy state if he becomes prime minister. Doha rejects the allegations and points to its mediation role, exposing Israel’s unresolved dependence on a country many Israelis consider hostile.
Former Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett has intensified his attack on Qatar, saying Doha bears responsibility for the October 7 massacre and should be formally designated an enemy state if he returns to office.
Bennett accused Qatar of financing the events that enabled the Hamas attack, continuing to host Hamas leaders and spreading anti-Israel influence through media and international institutions.
Qatar rejected the comments as false and politically motivated.
Doha said it has acted as a mediator and peace broker, helping to negotiate ceasefires, hostage releases and humanitarian arrangements.
The dispute reflects a real contradiction at the centre of Israeli policy.
Qatar has maintained relations with Hamas and hosted senior figures from the movement. It also transferred large amounts of money into Gaza over many years.
Those transfers were not secret.
Israeli governments, including Netanyahu-led administrations, permitted or facilitated Qatari payments because they believed the money could support fuel, public salaries, poor families and temporary stability.
Critics say the policy strengthened Hamas’s rule and freed other resources for military preparation.
Defenders say Israel faced difficult choices: allow Gaza’s civilian administration and energy system to collapse, or tolerate external funding through monitored channels.
After October 7, the distinction between humanitarian support and political empowerment became far harder to defend.
Bennett’s claim that Qatar “financed October 7” is stronger than saying Qatari money contributed to the environment in which Hamas grew.
To establish direct responsibility, evidence would need to show that Qatari officials knowingly funded the planning, weapons, training or operational preparation for the attack.
No such complete public evidentiary case has been released.
Qatar denies funding terrorism and says its engagement with Hamas was coordinated with the United States and Israel.
Bennett’s broader political argument does not depend entirely on proving direct operational financing.
He says a state that hosts Hamas leaders, funds Gaza under Hamas rule and amplifies hostile messaging cannot simultaneously be treated as a neutral mediator.
Many Israelis agree.
Qatar’s role in negotiations gives it influence precisely because it communicates with Hamas. Removing that channel could satisfy demands for accountability while making hostage diplomacy more difficult.
Mediation is not proof of neutrality.
Successful mediators often maintain relationships with actors considered illegitimate or violent. The question is whether Qatar uses access to reduce conflict or uses mediation to protect and empower Hamas.
Doha points to multiple agreements it helped facilitate. Israeli critics point to the years during which Hamas leaders lived openly in Qatar and built international legitimacy.
Bennett also said Qatar never condemned October 7 and instead celebrated it.
Qatari officials have condemned attacks on civilians in general terms and called for de-escalation, but Israeli critics argue that Doha avoided the direct and unambiguous condemnation expected after the massacre.
The precise public record matters. Broad diplomatic language should not automatically be equated with celebration, yet refusal to name Hamas can reasonably be criticised.
The term “enemy state” would have concrete legal consequences.
It could restrict travel, financial transactions, political contact and business relationships. It might also make official mediation impossible and place Israeli citizens or companies with Qatari links under legal scrutiny.
Bennett would need to explain how hostage negotiations would continue.
Another state could attempt to replace Qatar, but few governments possess the same combination of access, money, U.S. relations and communication with Hamas.
The statement is also part of an Israeli election campaign.
Bennett is challenging Netanyahu by arguing that the current government allowed Qatari influence into Gaza and even into the prime minister’s political environment.
The Qatargate investigation involving people around Netanyahu gives the accusation additional force.
Qatar says Bennett is spreading disinformation for electoral advantage.
Both sides have incentives to frame the debate in absolute terms.
Bennett gains by presenting Qatar as the financial architect of Israel’s worst security disaster. Doha gains by presenting itself as an indispensable peacemaker unfairly attacked by politicians.
The evidence supports a more complicated conclusion.
Qatar maintained and funded relationships that helped Hamas govern Gaza. Israel knew and accepted much of that arrangement. Qatar also became essential in negotiations after the attack.
The open question is whether designating Doha an enemy would correct a dangerous policy of dependence—or remove one of the only functioning communication channels before Israel has found a credible alternative.