NATO Drills Near Kaliningrad: Smart Pressure on Putin—or a Shortcut to Direct Russia–Europe War?
Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski argues that intensified NATO exercises near Kaliningrad could force Russia to divert troops from Ukraine. The proposal exploits a possible weakness—but exercises around a nuclear-armed enclave can be misread.
Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski has reportedly called for intensified NATO exercises near Russia's Kaliningrad exclave, arguing that pressure there could force Moscow to redirect troops from the Ukrainian front. The idea is strategically intelligible and potentially dangerous: it uses alliance territory to impose a dilemma without crossing into Russia, but it operates beside nuclear-capable forces and one of Europe's most sensitive borders.
The Times reported Sikorski's proposal and his assessment that Kaliningrad currently has very few troops because personnel were drawn into other missions. That should not be mistaken for an independently verified order of battle. Open-source analysts have documented redeployments, yet Kaliningrad still hosts the Baltic Fleet, air defenses, Iskander missile systems, aviation and military infrastructure.
An exercise could force Russia to respond even if NATO never intends an attack. Moscow might move units, activate radars, disperse missiles and retain reserves that otherwise could support Ukraine. This is the logic of imposing costs through uncertainty.
Poland would say the activity is defensive and conducted on NATO territory. Russia would ask why drills are deliberately designed to pull forces away from an active war. The same maneuver can be legally routine and strategically coercive. Military signaling lives in that gap.
Kaliningrad's geography magnifies risk. The exclave lies between Poland and Lithuania, close to the Suwałki corridor connecting the Baltic states to the rest of NATO. In a conflict, Russian planners could seek to isolate the Baltics; NATO planners would need to suppress missiles and protect reinforcement routes. Both sides exercise around those scenarios.
Supporters of Sikorski's idea argue that Russia exploits Western fear of escalation. If NATO avoids legitimate training near its own borders, Moscow gains a sanctuary and can concentrate more power against Ukraine. Demonstrating readiness may deter Russian adventurism and reassure Baltic allies.
Critics warn that exercises can conceal real preparations. Aircraft, electronic-warfare systems and strike platforms gathering near the enclave may look like the opening phase of an attack. A radar error, drone incursion or weapon malfunction could trigger rapid decisions before political leaders understand what happened.
NATO can reduce that risk through notification, observers, clear geographic limits and established communications. But excessive transparency may undermine the exercise's purpose of creating uncertainty. Deterrence requires capability and ambiguity; crisis stability requires predictability. The balance is delicate.
The proposal also assumes Russia must react symmetrically. Moscow could instead ignore the drills, threaten nuclear deployment, conduct cyberattacks or intensify strikes in Ukraine. An attempt to divert ground troops might produce escalation in another domain.
Sikorski emphasized that the goal is not seizing Kaliningrad. That clarification is important, because any real attack on Russian territory would risk a direct NATO-Russia war. Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, have used nuclear language when warning Europe. Such rhetoric can be coercive, but nuclear-capable systems in the enclave make the escalation problem real.
Domestic politics are also present. Poland spends heavily on defense and wants sustained U.S. forces in Europe. Calling for bolder exercises signals leadership on NATO's eastern flank. It may also pressure allies whose governments fear that assertive Polish proposals could narrow diplomatic space.
The military benefit should be measured rather than assumed. If Russia has already reduced ground forces in Kaliningrad, a larger NATO drill may draw only temporary deployments or air and missile assets that were not destined for Ukraine. The exercise could generate headlines without materially relieving Ukrainian forces, while still imposing financial and escalation costs on NATO.
Personal attacks on Sikorski's wife, historian Anne Applebaum, add nothing to assessing the policy. Spouses do not become legitimate substitutes for evidence about ministerial decisions. Arguments should test objectives, force posture and risk—not use sexism or conspiracy as analysis.
The strongest version of Sikorski's case is that a well-signaled drill exposes Russian overstretch without firing a shot. The strongest counterargument is that deliberately manipulating an adversary's threat perception around a nuclearized enclave may create a crisis whose outcome no planner controls.
What to watch next
Watch NATO exercise notices, Russian troop movements, Iskander dispersal, air-defense activation and whether Moscow uses reciprocal drills. Do allies endorse Sikorski's proposal or distance themselves? Are military hotlines tested beforehand? If Kaliningrad has been weakened, pressure could force Russia to make choices—but is drawing Moscow's attention away from Ukraine worth increasing the chance that the Baltic becomes a second confrontation zone?