Pakistan and America’s ‘True Friendship’: Strategic Opening or the Old Trap?
As Washington praises Pakistan’s role in Iran mediation, critics warn that U.S. friendship has often come with heavy costs for partner states.
Pakistan is being praised again in Washington. Its role in Iran mediation, its ties with Gulf states and its usefulness as a bridge to Tehran have suddenly made Islamabad look valuable to the United States. That is why some Pakistani observers are warning: be careful. The most dangerous moment may be when Washington starts calling you a “true friend.”
This is not paranoia pulled from nowhere. Pakistan has a long history of being useful to U.S. strategy and then paying a heavy price. During the Cold War, the Afghan jihad and the war on terror, Pakistan became a frontline partner, intelligence hub, logistics route and security subcontractor. It received aid, weapons and diplomatic relevance. It also inherited militancy, sanctions, distrust, refugee pressures, internal polarization and a reputation problem that still shapes its foreign policy.
The Iran crisis gives Pakistan a new opening. Islamabad has relationships with Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, Turkey, Qatar and the United States. That makes it useful. Field Marshal Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif have tried to position Pakistan as a mediator capable of calming a war that threatens energy, shipping and regional stability.
But usefulness is not the same as friendship. Great powers often call smaller or weaker partners “friends” when they need something. The real test is what happens after the crisis. Does Pakistan gain debt relief, energy security, trade access and diplomatic space? Or does it become responsible for delivering Iranian concessions that Tehran may not want to give?
Pakistan’s biggest risk is being pulled into contradictions. Saudi Arabia may want Pakistan aligned with Gulf security. Iran may want Pakistan to resist U.S. pressure. China wants stability and energy flows. Washington wants leverage over Iran and perhaps distance between Islamabad and Beijing. Turkey wants Muslim-world relevance. Israel watches Pakistan’s nuclear status and political posture with suspicion. Every side sees Pakistan as useful, but not necessarily as sovereign.
The “true friendship” warning is therefore a call for realism. Pakistan should take diplomatic credit, but not confuse temporary leverage with permanent respect. It should avoid becoming the guarantor of promises it cannot enforce. If Iran refuses a demand, Washington may blame mediators. If the U.S. changes terms, Iran may blame mediators. If Gulf shipping remains unstable, everyone may ask what Pakistan actually delivered.
There is also a domestic dimension. Pakistani leaders may present mediation as evidence of restored global importance. That can boost prestige. But if Pakistan appears too close to Trump, or too willing to pressure Iran, it may face criticism at home. If it appears too close to Iran, it risks Gulf anger. The diplomatic sweet spot is narrow.
None of this means Pakistan should reject engagement. On the contrary, successful mediation could give Islamabad rare relevance at a moment of economic and political stress. But it should define its interests clearly: energy security, regional stability, protection from sanctions spillover, no war on its borders, and balanced relations with all major actors.
The headline says America’s friendship is dangerous. The more precise lesson is that American friendship is transactional, as are most great-power relationships. Pakistan should not fear that reality. It should negotiate with eyes open.
In geopolitics, friendship is language. Interests are the contract.