Iran Says Trust in America Is Gone
Pezeshkian says attacks and sanctions destroyed trust in negotiations with Washington—but Iran is still transmitting proposals through mediators.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian says Tehran no longer trusts negotiations with the United States. In an interview aired during the UN General Assembly, he argued that earlier rounds of engagement were followed by attacks and sanctions, leaving Iran unsure what foundation any new agreement could have.
His language is severe, but it is not a final rejection of diplomacy. Iranian officials are still sending proposals through Qatar, Pakistan and other mediators. The dispute is therefore less about whether contact exists than about what must happen before either side treats contact as credible.
Why trust collapsed
Pezeshkian points to negotiations interrupted by military action, the killing of Iranian leaders and disputes over implementation of the June memorandum of understanding. From Tehran’s perspective, talks became a vulnerability: discussions exposed intentions and timelines while pressure continued.
Washington has its own record of mistrust. US officials accuse Iran of using negotiations to delay restrictions, continue sensitive nuclear work and rebuild military capacity. They also cite attacks on shipping and US regional bases as proof that Iranian commitments cannot be separated from conduct on the ground.
Both sides therefore describe themselves as the party deceived by the other.
Talks continue without the label
Iran’s latest proposal reportedly offered a pathway to reopen the Strait of Hormuz if the United States reduced military pressure, eased the blockade and committed to a diplomatic timetable. President Donald Trump rejected that roadmap while suggesting a deal might become possible after the US midterm elections.
Pezeshkian has said Iran is ready for dialogue without the language of force. Hardliners in Tehran insist that conditions must be implemented before formal negotiations resume. These positions leave space for indirect bargaining while protecting each side from appearing to surrender.
That pattern is common in wartime diplomacy. Governments publicly deny talks, call exchanges “messages” or “technical contacts,” and negotiate through mediators until a package is politically presentable.
Can trust be replaced by verification?
Arms-control agreements do not require friendship. They require steps that can be measured, sequenced and reversed. Iran could permit defined IAEA access, cap enrichment or place material under monitoring. The United States could specify sanctions relief, unblock transactions or adjust military operations on a published schedule.
Escrow arrangements, third-party monitoring and automatic snapback clauses could reduce reliance on promises. The obstacle is that each side fears moving first. Tehran worries concessions will be banked and pressure restored. Washington fears relief will be irreversible while Iranian compliance proves temporary.
Domestic audiences constrain both leaders
Pezeshkian is considered more open to engagement than Iran’s hardline factions, but he cannot ignore a public and security establishment shaped by months of war. Trump faces voters angry about fuel prices and military costs while also promising not to reward Iran.
Waiting until after the midterms may make US compromise easier. It can also allow more attacks, casualties and miscalculation to destroy the remaining space.
What each side would call success
Iran wants survival, sanctions relief, protected oil exports and recognition of a peaceful nuclear right. The United States wants reliable limits on nuclear capability, safer shipping, reduced attacks on its forces and constraints on Iranian regional power.
Those goals overlap around stability but collide over leverage. The party that relaxes pressure first may feel it has surrendered the only tool capable of producing concessions.
The danger of diplomatic theater
Public threats can coexist with private bargaining, but they also narrow the range of acceptable compromise. If every concession is framed as humiliation, leaders may prefer an economically and militarily costly stalemate to an agreement their rivals can attack. A durable process would need disciplined messaging, protected mediator channels and immediate crisis procedures so a single maritime incident does not erase weeks of technical work.
Reading a fast-moving story
Breaking reports often mix verified events, official claims, anonymous-source reporting and commentary. Those layers should not be treated as interchangeable. A government statement confirms what that government says; it does not independently prove attribution, intent or the full scale of an event. Images, documents and technical records can strengthen a claim, but each can also lack context. The most reliable assessment is therefore provisional and should be updated when named authorities, independent investigators or primary records provide new evidence.
What to watch next
- A written US response to Iran’s proposal.
- IAEA access and the status of enriched uranium.
- Changes in Hormuz traffic and attacks.
- Mediator travel by Qatar, Oman or Pakistan.
- Any limited confidence-building exchange before the midterms.
Has trust truly disappeared, or is “no trust” the argument for a more mechanical agreement in which neither side has to believe the other?