‘Bring Assad Back’ or Anger Over Fuel? Syria’s Biggest Protests Under Al-Sharaa Test the New Government
Fuel-price increases have triggered Syria’s broadest protests since Assad’s fall. Sporadic pro-Assad slogans are drawing attention, but what is the movement really demanding?
Syria’s sharp fuel-price increases have produced the broadest street protests since Bashar al-Assad was overthrown, confronting President Ahmed al-Sharaa with an uncomfortable political test: liberation from an old government does not protect a new one from the price of diesel, transport and bread.
Reuters reported that the government increased diesel prices by 40%, while gasoline rose by roughly 26% to 28%. Demonstrators burned tires and blocked roads linking major cities, and some protests disrupted petroleum-tanker movements. Anger spread through parts of Aleppo, Idlib, Raqqa, Hasakah and other areas with different political histories.
The most explosive social-media framing says Syrians are demanding Assad’s return. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported slogans invoking the former president, and videos of individual confrontations have circulated. Those episodes matter because they show how economic pain can rehabilitate memories of a discredited order. But they do not yet prove that a coordinated national pro-Assad movement controls the protests.
Verified reporting presents a broader and more practical list of grievances: diesel, gasoline, cooking gas, transport costs, wages and the competence of the Energy Ministry. Some demonstrators demanded the energy minister’s resignation. Others contrasted present prices with the Assad era—not necessarily because they support its prisons, corruption or wartime violence, but because households compare governments through what they can afford today.
That distinction is politically important. A protester can say “prices were lower under Assad” without endorsing Assad’s entire rule. Governments often misread economic nostalgia as ideological loyalty, while opposition activists sometimes dismiss it as manipulation. Both reactions can conceal the central fact: people whose incomes cannot cover transport and food are communicating a loss of confidence.
Al-Sharaa’s government attributes the increases to expensive imports, disruption in regional energy markets and maintenance at the Baniyas refinery. Syria remains heavily dependent on imported fuel after years of war damaged production and infrastructure. The Iran conflict, restrictions in the Red Sea and higher crude prices have raised procurement costs at exactly the moment Damascus is trying to reconstruct the country.
Supporters of the new order argue that it inherited a ruined economy, sanctions, corruption networks and a fractured state. They contend that comparing nominal pump prices across governments ignores shortages, black-market premiums and the collapse of the Syrian currency under Assad.
Critics answer that legitimacy cannot be inherited forever from the previous regime’s failures. They ask why ordinary people must absorb sudden increases while information about procurement contracts, transit revenue and public spending remains limited. Removing sanctions may facilitate payment and investment, but it does not automatically create refineries, stable electricity or accountable institutions.
The protests also reveal Syria’s geographic complexity. The same fuel decision affects former rebel strongholds, Kurdish-administered areas, government-held cities and communities once associated with Assad differently. A national economic grievance can create temporary solidarity, but it can also be exploited by ex-regime networks, foreign governments or armed factions.
Security-force behavior will determine whether the crisis remains economic. If authorities permit peaceful protest and explain costs transparently, anger may pressure the government without becoming an uprising. Arrests, shootings or collective accusations of disloyalty could transform price demonstrations into a wider struggle over political rights.
The phrase “even sanctions under Assad never produced prices like this” is emotionally powerful but analytically incomplete. Global oil prices, exchange rates, subsidies and supply routes have changed. The right comparison is not simply one number at the pump; it is the share of household income required for energy and the availability of fuel at that price.
For al-Sharaa, the danger is less that Assad returns physically than that the old regime returns as a political benchmark. When citizens begin using yesterday’s autocracy to shame today’s authorities, the revolution’s moral credit is being converted into a performance audit.
The government’s fiscal choice deserves attention too. Fuel subsidies can protect households but drain a nearly bankrupt state, encourage smuggling and benefit wealthy consumers alongside the poor. Immediate liberalization can be equally destructive when wages and public transport do not adjust. A credible reform would explain the real import price, identify who receives compensation and publish a timetable. Without that social contract, technically justified pricing can still become politically explosive—and opponents of every persuasion will fill the information gap.
What to watch next
Will Damascus reverse or phase the increases, publish its import costs or offer targeted support? Do pro-Assad slogans spread beyond isolated crowds? Will security forces tolerate roadblocks without lethal escalation? And can a government born from military victory build legitimacy through everyday administration before economic disappointment becomes a new national opposition?