U.S. Brokers Secret Deal to Remove Assad-Era Nuclear Material From Syria’s ‘Site 99’: Nonproliferation Success—or Israeli Ultimatum?
Axios reports that Washington secretly brokered an agreement among Syria, Israel and the IAEA to secure and remove nuclear material linked to Bashar al-Assad’s former al-Kibar reactor program. Israel had threatened to strike Site 99 if the material was not removed.
The Trump administration has brokered a secret agreement involving Syria, Israel and the International Atomic Energy Agency to remove remaining nuclear material connected to Bashar al-Assad’s clandestine nuclear programme, according to Axios.
The material is stored at a location referred to as Site 99 and is linked to the former al-Kibar reactor project.
Israel destroyed the al-Kibar reactor in a 2007 airstrike before it became operational.
The IAEA later concluded that the site was very likely a nuclear reactor that Syria should have declared under its safeguards obligations.
Nearly two decades later, the legacy of that programme is still creating security concerns.
Axios reports that Israel had been monitoring Site 99 and threatened to bomb it if the material was not removed.
Israeli officials feared that Syria’s new government could gain access to sensitive material or expertise, potentially with help from Turkey.
Washington instead pushed for a diplomatic solution through the IAEA.
That is significant because bombing a site containing nuclear material can create contamination, destroy evidence and trigger a new regional confrontation.
Removing and securing the material under international supervision is the safer nonproliferation option if the agreement is implemented properly.
The word “nuclear material” also needs context.
The report does not mean Syria was sitting on a ready nuclear weapon.
Material associated with an undeclared reactor programme can include uranium compounds, fuel-related substances, samples or equipment that are important for safeguards and proliferation analysis without being directly usable as a bomb.
Exact inventories and enrichment levels matter enormously.
The IAEA is the institution best placed to characterise and secure such material.
The secrecy of the agreement reflects regional distrust.
Israel does not trust the new Syrian authorities automatically simply because Assad is gone.
Syria does not want Israel deciding through airstrikes what facilities can exist on Syrian territory.
Turkey’s growing influence in Damascus adds another dimension because Israel increasingly views Turkish-Syrian military cooperation as a strategic challenge.
The United States is therefore acting as mediator among governments that do not share basic security assumptions.
If successful, the arrangement could become an example of practical nonproliferation diplomacy.
A potentially dangerous site is secured without another bombing campaign.
Syria gains an opportunity to demonstrate compliance with international safeguards.
Israel removes a perceived proliferation risk.
The IAEA gains access and custody.
Failure would be more dangerous.
If removal stalls, Israel may return to the military option.
A strike could damage U.S.-Syrian relations and intensify tension with Turkey.
The operation also raises historical accountability questions.
The Assad government denied for years that al-Kibar was part of a nuclear weapons-related programme.
Securing material connected to the site may provide new technical evidence about what Syria was actually building.
The open question is whether the secret deal finally closes the al-Kibar nuclear file—or reveals that remnants of Assad’s programme remained more substantial and accessible than the international community understood for almost twenty years.