Did the UAE Warn Netanyahu Before October 7? Explosive Election Claim Triggers a Defamation Battle in Israel
A new book and Haaretz report allege Mohammed bin Zayed warned Netanyahu about Hamas days before October 7. Netanyahu calls it an absolute lie and plans to sue; the UAE has neither confirmed nor denied the account.
An allegation that the president of the United Arab Emirates warned Benjamin Netanyahu about Hamas roughly ten days before October 7 has detonated in the middle of Israel's election campaign. If proven, it would deepen the central accusation against the prime minister: not simply that Israel's system failed to detect the attack, but that a direct foreign warning reached the top and was not acted upon.
The claim appears in a forthcoming book and reporting by Haaretz journalist Shlomi Eldar. Citing high-level sources, the account says UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed spoke with Netanyahu for about 45 minutes and warned of a major Hamas operation. Netanyahu calls the story an “absolute lie,” says no record of such a call exists and has announced a defamation lawsuit.
The UAE has neither publicly confirmed nor denied the warning. Its restrained response emphasizes continuing communication with Israeli leaders but does not settle whether this specific conversation happened. That leaves three evidentiary layers: anonymous-source reporting, an unequivocal denial and an external government declining to resolve the dispute.
A courtroom could produce evidence journalism cannot immediately obtain. Telephone logs, staff diaries, secure-call records and testimony from aides could establish whether a conversation occurred. Even if it did, the content matters. A general concern about escalation is different from a warning naming Hamas, timing, routes or an imminent mass attack.
Warnings are also assessed in context. Israeli security agencies reportedly received multiple signs before October 7, while officials believed Hamas was deterred or focused on governance. Intelligence systems face constant threat reporting, much of it vague or contradictory. A failure to prioritize an accurate warning can still be grave, but judging responsibility requires knowing its specificity and distribution.
The political impact is immediate because accountability for October 7 remains unresolved. Netanyahu's opponents say he governed during the worst security failure in Israeli history and resisted full responsibility. His supporters argue military and intelligence chiefs controlled operational warning and that election-season accusations are designed to remove him before investigations conclude.
Timing does not make the story false. Journalists often publish books and investigations when public interest is highest, and elections increase relevance. Timing also creates incentives for sources to shape the race. The correct response is disclosure and corroboration—not automatic belief or dismissal.
Former military chief Gadi Eisenkot is central to speculation about Netanyahu's successor. He joined the wartime cabinet and lost his son Gal in fighting in Gaza, giving his security views unusual personal weight. He is a significant opposition figure. But Israel does not directly elect a prime minister; voters elect the Knesset, and a coalition capable of commanding a majority determines who governs.
Claims that Eisenkot is already “projected” to win or that Israelis want someone harder than Netanyahu on Iran are not supported by the evidence cited with the warning story. Polls can measure party seats, bloc strength and head-to-head suitability, but candidates such as Naftali Bennett and other opposition leaders may also shape coalition arithmetic. A single survey or betting market cannot name the next prime minister.
Netanyahu's corruption trial, conduct of the Gaza war, Iran policy and relationship with Trump will all influence the vote. Trump has said it is most appropriate to stay out while leaving open the possibility of endorsement. Non-endorsement may reflect neutrality, tactical uncertainty or personal tension; it does not itself prove a break with Netanyahu.
The UAE faces its own dilemma. Confirming a warning could damage relations with Netanyahu and expose intelligence channels. Denying it could place Abu Dhabi inside Israel's campaign and contradict sources if records later emerge. Silence protects diplomacy but allows the allegation to grow.
Israelis deserve more than partisan certainty. The question is not simply whether one politician received one call, but how intelligence reached decision-makers, which assumptions blocked action and whether reforms followed. Accountability should not depend solely on election narratives or defamation law.
The alleged UAE role also tests the Abraham Accords. Quiet security cooperation was one of normalization's main promised benefits. If Abu Dhabi did transmit concern, both countries must ask why the channel failed to change readiness. If it did not, a fabricated story risks poisoning precisely the relationship that could improve warning. Either way, the UAE should not be reduced to a prop in Israel's domestic campaign; its decision to speak or remain silent reflects regional security interests of its own.
What to watch next
Watch Netanyahu's actual court filing, discovery requests, phone and diary records, the UAE's wording and any testimony from security officials. Does the allegation identify specific attack details or only general concern? How do seat and coalition polls—not social-media projections—rank Eisenkot and other challengers? The election may punish Netanyahu, vindicate him or produce stalemate, but only documented evidence can determine whether a warning was ignored.