Washington Wants China to Help Strangle Iran’s Economy. Beijing Says Sanctions Won’t End the War.
Scott Bessent is urging China to join what Washington calls the toughest sanctions campaign ever imposed on Iran. Beijing rejects the strategy and says sanctions will not resolve the conflict, setting up a test of whether the U.S. can economically isolate Tehran without Chinese cooperation.
The United States is trying to turn its war with Iran into a global economic loyalty test, and China is the country that matters most.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent says Washington is preparing what he calls the toughest sanctions in history against Iran and wants allies and trading partners to join the pressure campaign.
He has explicitly urged China to cooperate.
Beijing’s answer is no.
Chinese officials say sanctions and economic coercion will not resolve the Middle East conflict and continue calling for negotiations between Washington and Tehran.
The disagreement is not abstract.
China buys the overwhelming majority of Iran’s exported crude oil.
That makes Chinese refiners, banks, shipping companies and intermediaries the central target of any attempt to economically isolate Tehran.
Bessent’s argument is that China also has a reason to want Hormuz reopened. Beijing imports huge volumes of energy from the Gulf and is vulnerable to high oil and shipping costs.
Washington therefore believes Chinese self-interest should eventually push Beijing toward cooperation even if China rejects U.S. sanctions politically.
That may underestimate the geopolitical stakes.
China does not want the United States to establish a precedent where Washington can decide which countries Beijing is allowed to trade with through secondary sanctions.
From China’s perspective, participating voluntarily could strengthen an American financial weapon that might later be used against China itself.
Beijing also sees Iran as a strategic partner and an important element of a more multipolar international system.
That does not mean China will absorb unlimited costs for Tehran.
Commercial behaviour is already changing.
Iranian crude offers to Chinese buyers have declined sharply because the blockade and shipping disruption have reduced available cargoes. Some Chinese refiners are looking for alternative supplies.
This is an important distinction.
China can reject sanctions diplomatically while companies still reduce Iranian business because it becomes physically difficult or financially dangerous.
Washington does not need Beijing to publicly endorse the campaign if Chinese banks and refiners quietly become more cautious.
That is why enforcement matters more than declarations.
The U.S. Treasury can target shipping firms, insurers, intermediaries and financial institutions that facilitate Iranian trade.
The effectiveness depends on how much those companies value access to the U.S. financial system.
Small firms with little American exposure may continue taking the risk.
Large Chinese banks may be much more cautious.
Iran has decades of experience navigating this problem through shadow fleets, shell companies, barter, discounted crude and indirect transactions.
It has survived repeated maximum-pressure campaigns.
Survival does not mean sanctions are ineffective.
Iran’s economy is under severe pressure, and losing oil revenue reduces the government’s ability to import goods, stabilise the currency and fund reconstruction.
The current U.S. strategy combines those sanctions with a physical naval blockade, making this campaign harder to evade than financial restrictions alone.
China’s resistance therefore becomes a test of two competing systems of power.
Washington controls extraordinary financial and maritime leverage.
Beijing possesses enormous purchasing power and can provide alternative trade channels.
Iran sits between them.
The confrontation could also widen beyond oil.
If the U.S. begins sanctioning Chinese firms aggressively, Beijing may retaliate against American companies or restrict exports of strategically important materials.
A campaign designed to isolate Iran could then become another front in the U.S.-China economic rivalry.
That risk explains why China keeps pushing diplomacy.
Ending the Iran war would reopen energy flows without forcing Beijing to accept American sanctions authority.
Washington suspects China prefers negotiations because they preserve Iran and weaken U.S. pressure.
Both interpretations can be true.
The open question is whether the United States can force enough Chinese commercial compliance to break Iran economically—or whether trying to do so converts the Iran conflict into a larger confrontation over who has the power to set the rules of global trade.