Venezuela May Quit OPEC After 66 Years: Is Washington Rewriting the Global Oil Map?
Caracas is reportedly considering leaving the oil cartel it helped create as U.S. officials pursue deeper access to Venezuelan fields. No decision has been made, but the possibility could reshape OPEC and energy power.
Venezuela helped create OPEC in Baghdad in 1960. Now, after more than six decades inside the producer group, Caracas is reportedly considering the once-unthinkable: walking away.
Bloomberg reported that Venezuelan officials have closely examined an exit and discussed the idea with American counterparts. The people cited were not identified, no final decision has been made, and neither Caracas nor OPEC has announced a formal withdrawal. Reuters said it could not independently verify the report. Those caveats matter because a possible option in private talks is not yet policy.
The timing nevertheless makes strategic sense. The United States is negotiating for long-term access to Venezuelan reserves, including arrangements that could bring American companies into a group of oilfields in the Orinoco Belt and Lake Maracaibo. Washington wants additional supply while the Iran war and restricted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz keep energy security at the center of global politics.
OPEC membership could become a constraint if Venezuelan production recovers. For years, sanctions, underinvestment, power failures, mismanagement and deteriorating infrastructure kept output far below historic levels. Quotas were therefore less restrictive than Venezuela’s physical limitations. A large inflow of foreign capital could change that equation: Caracas might prefer to produce as much as fields and ports allow rather than negotiate a ceiling with other exporters.
Supporters of an exit would call it an economic liberation. Venezuela has the world’s largest officially reported proven crude reserves but has failed to convert that geological wealth into reliable prosperity. New technology, transparent contracts, restored maintenance and access to finance could raise production, revenue and employment. American refiners are also well suited to process Venezuela’s heavy crude.
Critics would see a transfer of sovereignty rather than its recovery. Deals granting U.S. entities privileged access could make Venezuela’s energy policy dependent on Washington after years of confrontation. The country’s constitution reserves central roles for the state in petroleum development, and any arrangement that appears to sell control cheaply could face legal and political resistance.
There is also a practical problem: production is not the same as export capacity. Reuters has reported that tankers are already facing long delays at aging Venezuelan terminals. Power instability, insufficient blending capacity, poor dredging and unreliable pipelines cannot be solved by a geopolitical announcement. Foreign companies will demand enforceable contracts, security and a way to recover capital over decades.
For OPEC, the symbolic damage could exceed the immediate loss of barrels. The United Arab Emirates left OPEC and OPEC+ in May, seeking more freedom to use its expanded capacity. If a founding member follows only months later, markets may conclude that producer solidarity is weakening just as geopolitical disruptions make coordination more valuable.
Yet an exit could also backfire on Venezuela. OPEC offers diplomatic influence, shared market intelligence and a platform where a mid-sized current producer sits beside Saudi Arabia and other major exporters. Outside the group, Caracas would gain volume freedom but lose institutional leverage. If multiple exporters maximize output, the result could be a price war that lowers revenue for everyone—including Venezuela.
Washington’s motives deserve equal scrutiny. Lower oil prices would help American consumers and reduce inflationary pressure, while privileged access would strengthen U.S. supply security. It could also displace Chinese and Russian influence. Those objectives may overlap with Venezuelan reconstruction, but they are not identical to it.
The word “foreign” should not be treated as synonymous with “American.” European, Asian and regional firms may also seek roles, and Caracas could use competition among investors to obtain better terms. Conversely, U.S. sanctions and political control over licenses may give Washington an unusually powerful gatekeeping position.
The reported debate is therefore larger than a membership card. It asks whether OPEC remains capable of balancing the interests of recovering producers, established Gulf powers and states under wartime disruption. It also asks whether Venezuela’s new alignment will rebuild a sovereign industry or replace one dependency with another.
Oil consumers should be cautious about assuming an immediate price windfall. Venezuelan crude is heavy, expensive to revive and dependent on specialized refining. Output gains may take years, while an OPEC rupture could initially increase volatility rather than supply. The politically attractive promise of cheap barrels may therefore arrive far earlier than the engineering, contracts and port repairs needed to deliver them.
What to watch next
Watch for a formal Venezuelan notification, changes to OPEC quota treatment, publication of oilfield contract terms, parliamentary or court challenges, port investment and measurable production gains. Until then, “Vexit” is a serious reported option—not a completed break. The decisive question is who controls the fields, who carries the risk and who receives the revenue if the oil finally flows.