Why Isn’t Iran Attacking Israel Directly? Victor Gao’s Nuclear Warning and the Logic of Deterrence
A viral quote warning Israel against nuclear use has revived a bigger question: why are Iran’s latest attacks mostly aimed at U.S. bases and Gulf logistics rather than Israel itself?
A viral warning attributed to Chinese commentator Victor Gao has resurfaced one of the most sensitive questions in the U.S.-Iran war: why does Iran appear to be attacking U.S. bases and Gulf logistics more than Israel directly?
The quote is blunt: if Israel used a nuclear warhead against another country, including Iran, it would mean the demise of Israel as a state. Whether one sees that as analysis, warning or rhetorical escalation, it touches the hidden center of Middle East security: Israel’s undeclared nuclear capability and Iran’s effort to build deterrence without openly crossing the nuclear threshold.
Israel maintains nuclear ambiguity. It does not publicly confirm or deny possessing nuclear weapons. That ambiguity has served Israeli strategy for decades. It deters existential threats while avoiding the diplomatic consequences that would follow open admission. Iran, by contrast, has long insisted it does not seek nuclear weapons while defending enrichment and missile capabilities as sovereign rights.
In the current conflict, Iran’s target selection appears political as much as military. By attacking U.S. bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan or Iraq, Tehran is sending a message to Washington and host states: the cost of supporting strikes on Iran will be regional. But avoiding a massive direct attack on Israel may also reflect calculation.
A large Iranian strike on Israel could unify Israeli politics, justify expanded Israeli operations, and pull the U.S. even deeper into the war. Attacking U.S. facilities may sound more dangerous, but Tehran may believe it can calibrate those strikes more carefully: hit logistics, radars, aircraft, drones, fuel depots or ports while avoiding a single event that forces total escalation.
There is also geography. Iran can pressure the global economy through the Strait of Hormuz and threaten American regional infrastructure. That gives Tehran leverage over Washington’s real pain points: oil markets, troop casualties, Gulf alliances and domestic approval. Israel is a central adversary, but the U.S. is the superpower with the global economic exposure.
The nuclear question complicates everything. If Israel’s nuclear ambiguity becomes part of public discourse during a hot war, pressure will grow on international institutions to ask why Iran is punished for potential nuclear capability while Israel’s arsenal remains outside formal inspection. Iran will exploit that argument. So will many Global South governments.
Supporters of Israel answer that Israel faces existential threats and cannot be compared with Iran’s revolutionary system. Critics respond that rules cannot be rules if they only apply to enemies of Washington. The debate is not going away.
The important point is that nuclear deterrence works through uncertainty and fear. No serious actor should casually talk about nuclear use in the Middle East. A nuclear strike, or even a credible threat of one, would not end the conflict neatly. It would transform it into a global crisis.
The headline asks why Iran is attacking everyone except one country. The answer may be that Tehran is not avoiding Israel out of kindness or weakness. It may be choosing targets that create maximum strategic pressure while keeping the door open to controlled escalation. That is not peace. It is deterrence by fire.