Xi and Putin Likely to Meet in India at September BRICS Summit: Can Modi Balance China, Russia and the West?
Vladimir Putin is confirmed for the September 12–13 BRICS summit in New Delhi and Xi Jinping is widely expected to attend. Their presence would make India the stage for a major display of non-Western power while New Delhi balances border tensions with China and deep ties with Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is confirmed to attend the BRICS leaders’ summit in New Delhi on September 12 and 13, while Chinese President Xi Jinping is widely expected to join him.
Indian reporting says both governments have signalled their leaders’ participation. Russian officials publicly confirmed Putin’s attendance.
Xi’s visit remains described as likely rather than finally confirmed in the strongest available public reporting.
If Xi travels to New Delhi, it would be his first visit to India since 2019.
That alone would make the summit diplomatically significant.
Relations between India and China deteriorated sharply after deadly border clashes in the Galwan Valley in 2020. Military deployments along the Line of Actual Control increased, trade continued and political trust fell.
The two governments have slowly reopened dialogue.
A Xi visit would signal that both sides want to stabilise relations without resolving every territorial disagreement.
Putin’s attendance presents a different relationship.
India and Russia maintain decades of defence, energy and diplomatic ties. New Delhi increased purchases of discounted Russian oil after the invasion of Ukraine and resisted Western pressure to isolate Moscow completely.
India has also expanded cooperation with the United States, Japan and Australia through the Quad.
This creates the foreign-policy balance Prime Minister Narendra Modi prefers: strategic autonomy rather than formal alignment with one bloc.
Hosting Xi and Putin while maintaining strong Western partnerships demonstrates that strategy.
BRICS has expanded far beyond its original five members. The grouping now includes major Middle Eastern, African and Asian states and represents a large share of global population and economic output.
Members do not share one ideology.
India has serious disputes with China. Saudi Arabia and Iran are regional rivals. Some members are close to the United States, while Russia is under extensive Western sanctions.
BRICS therefore functions more as a platform for non-Western influence than a unified alliance.
Russia and China want the group to reduce Western dominance in finance and global institutions. India supports reform of the international system but resists turning BRICS into an explicitly anti-American bloc.
That tension will shape the Delhi summit.
Currency and payment systems will likely be discussed. Western sanctions on Russia and Iran have increased interest in trade that does not rely entirely on the dollar.
A common BRICS currency remains politically and technically difficult. Expanding local-currency settlement and alternative payment networks is more realistic.
Energy will also dominate. Russia and Iran are major producers. China and India are major consumers.
The Iran war and instability around Hormuz have made energy security and shipping routes urgent.
India can use the summit to promote itself as a diplomatic bridge. It maintains working relations with Israel, Iran, Russia, the United States and Gulf states.
That range creates opportunities for mediation but also exposes contradictions.
New Delhi condemns terrorism and supports sovereignty while avoiding direct condemnation of some partners’ military actions.
The summit may also become a test of Western influence.
Putin travels despite an International Criminal Court warrant because India is not obligated as an ICC member to arrest him. His presence demonstrates that Russia retains diplomatic access despite sanctions.
Xi’s presence would demonstrate that China can reset relations with India while remaining its primary Asian strategic competitor.
For Modi, the image of both leaders in New Delhi reinforces India’s status as a major independent power.
It also creates domestic questions. Can India welcome Xi without appearing to ignore unresolved border issues? Can it host Putin while maintaining credibility with Ukraine and Europe?
Strategic autonomy works only if partners believe India can say no as well as yes.
The summit’s substantive outcome will matter more than photographs.
Will China and India announce new border confidence-building measures? Will Russia offer defence or energy agreements? Will BRICS create practical financial mechanisms?
The open question is whether New Delhi becomes the site of a genuine rebalancing in Eurasian politics—or simply the stage for a powerful photograph of Xi and Putin together while the conflicts dividing BRICS members remain unresolved.