Xi Jinping Removes His Most Powerful General: What Zhang Youxia’s Fall Reveals About China’s PLA Purge
China formally removed Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from the state Central Military Commission. Corruption is the official explanation; coup and Taiwan-policy theories remain unproved.
China has formally removed General Zhang Youxia and General Liu Zhenli from the state Central Military Commission, turning a months-long investigation into the most consequential leadership purge of Xi Jinping's military rule. The confirmed action is extraordinary; the popular stories of a failed coup or a secret rebellion over Taiwan remain unconfirmed.
The officer's correct name is Zhang Youxia, not “Zhang Yushuo.” At 76, Zhang served as a CMC vice-chairman and was the People's Liberation Army's highest-ranking professional officer, second only to Xi as commission chairman. Liu headed the CMC Joint Staff Department and was also a commission member.
On August 28, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress removed both men from the state CMC after the Communist Party announced in January that they were being investigated for “serious violations of discipline and law.” The phrase usually signals corruption or grave political misconduct, but Beijing has not published charge sheets.
China maintains parallel party and state military commissions with largely overlapping membership. Reuters reported that the August measure clearly removed the officers from the state body, while their precise formal status in the party CMC was not publicly clarified. In practice, the investigation had already ended their authority.
Zhang's fall is especially surprising because his family was connected to Xi's. His father, revolutionary general Zhang Zongsun, served in circles linked to Xi Zhongxun, Xi Jinping's father. Zhang was kept in senior office beyond conventional retirement age and widely viewed as one of Xi's trusted military allies.
He was also among the last senior Chinese officers with battlefield experience, having fought during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and subsequent border clashes. His career later moved through the 13th Group Army, Shenyang Military Region, General Armaments Department and the post-reform Equipment Development Department.
That procurement history may be relevant. Xi's purge has swept through weapons acquisition and the Rocket Force, removing former defense ministers Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, senior missile commanders and numerous equipment officials. Corruption in contracts, testing or readiness could explain why the campaign reaches officers once considered loyal.
But anti-corruption campaigns in one-party systems also enforce political control. Loyalty and corruption are not mutually exclusive explanations. An officer may participate in entrenched patronage networks while also becoming vulnerable because Xi wants uncontested command. Without public evidence, outsiders cannot calculate the balance.
Taiwan speculation grows from the timing. A hollowed leadership could delay operational decisions and reveal doubts about procurement quality. Alternatively, Xi may believe removing compromised commanders improves readiness and loyalty before a crisis. The purge does not prove that Zhang opposed war or that an invasion timetable changed.
The CMC's shrinking membership creates a governance question. Reuters reported that only Xi and one active vice-chairman remained on a body that previously had seven members. Vacancies can centralize authority, but they can also slow coordination and produce fear among commanders who avoid bad news.
The purge may also affect China's defense industry beyond personnel. Suppliers facing retrospective corruption investigations can delay decisions, conceal overruns or avoid innovative projects that might fail. Discipline can reduce graft while bureaucratic fear reduces initiative. For a military trying to integrate missiles, space, cyber and naval operations, that tradeoff has operational consequences.
Foreign governments should avoid reading every vacancy as weakness. Centralization may let Xi appoint a younger cohort whose careers depend entirely on him. The direction of travel will become clearer only when replacements, promotion patterns and procurement reforms are visible.
For Taiwan planners, the relevant issue is not gossip about personal disloyalty but institutional performance. A joint campaign would require accurate missile inventories, reliable equipment, commanders able to report setbacks and a procurement system that cannot conceal defects. Each purge can expose weaknesses while simultaneously making honest reporting more dangerous.
Foreign intelligence services will examine exercises, promotions and defense-industry appointments for evidence of disruption. Yet outsiders have repeatedly overinterpreted elite changes in opaque systems. The defensible conclusion is narrower: Xi has accepted substantial short-term command turbulence to enforce discipline and control. Whether that makes the PLA more capable, more obedient or both remains unanswered.
What to watch next
Watch for party expulsions, military court proceedings, replacement appointments and language in PLA Daily about procurement or political loyalty. Zhang's removal proves that closeness to Xi offers no permanent protection. It does not yet prove a coup. The larger question is whether the purge is fixing corruption—or creating a command system in which nobody is willing to tell China's leader that a military plan may fail.