Zelensky and Netanyahu Meet After Years of Strain: Can Iran and Russia Turn Two Uneasy Leaders Into Partners?
Volodymyr Zelensky and Benjamin Netanyahu briefly spoke at Lindsey Graham’s funeral in their first face-to-face interaction in nearly three years. Iran’s support for Russia creates shared interests, but Israel’s caution toward Moscow and unverified allegations about Ukrainian covert activity continue to divide them.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu briefly spoke and shook hands before Senator Lindsey Graham’s funeral in Washington.
The exchange was serious but cordial, according to observers. It marked their first in-person interaction since September 2023 and their first known direct conversation since early 2025.
The two delegations considered arranging a formal meeting but ultimately did not hold one.
That limited contact is significant because Israel and Ukraine have strong reasons to cooperate—and a history of mutual frustration.
Iran is the clearest shared concern.
Russia has used Iranian-designed Shahed drones extensively against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Iran has deepened military and intelligence relations with Moscow. Ukraine has attacked vessels and logistics routes it says carry Iranian military cargo.
Israel is fighting Iran directly and sees Tehran’s missile, nuclear and regional networks as its principal strategic threat.
This creates obvious areas for information sharing.
Ukraine has years of battlefield experience detecting and intercepting Shahed-type drones. Israel has advanced air-defence technology, intelligence on Iranian systems and experience striking Iranian military infrastructure.
Cooperation could include electronic warfare, drone forensics, warning systems, medical support and protection of critical infrastructure.
The relationship has nevertheless remained strained.
Israel refused Kyiv’s repeated requests for major offensive weapons and advanced air-defence systems after Russia’s full-scale invasion. Israeli governments cited national-security concerns, limited inventories and the need to coordinate with Moscow in Syrian airspace.
Before Bashar al-Assad’s government fell, Russian forces controlled important airspace and air-defence systems in Syria. Israel wanted freedom to strike Iranian and Hezbollah targets without clashing with Russia.
The collapse of Assad’s government weakened that specific justification, but it did not eliminate Israel’s wider caution toward Moscow.
Netanyahu has maintained a working relationship with Vladimir Putin and has spoken with him frequently. Israel also has a large Russian-speaking population and security concerns involving Jewish communities in Russia.
Ukraine views this restraint as moral and strategic inconsistency.
Kyiv argues that Iran and Russia form one military partnership and that refusing to help Ukraine ultimately strengthens Israel’s enemy.
Israel has its own concerns about Ukraine’s expanding covert activity.
Ukrainian operatives have been reported or alleged in Sudan, Libya and other regions where Kyiv seeks to disrupt Russian interests. Some claims are supported by imagery and official statements; others originate from interested governments or intelligence-linked channels.
Iraq recently alleged that arrested cells confessed to working for Ukraine and carrying out limited bombings. Baghdad has not released enough public evidence to verify the allegation.
Repeating that claim as established terrorism would therefore be irresponsible.
Allegations involving Ukrainian far-right groups, antisemitism and operations in the Middle East also require separation.
Ukraine has documented problems with extremist symbols and antisemitic incidents, as do many countries. President Zelensky is Jewish, and the Ukrainian state officially rejects Nazi ideology. Russian propaganda routinely exaggerates marginal far-right activity to portray the entire country as extremist.
Concern should be based on specific organisations and conduct rather than national stereotypes.
Economic disputes add another layer.
Ukraine has criticised trade involving grain or goods originating from Russian-occupied territories. Reports have also scrutinised ships connected to Russia’s sanctions-evading fleet and their use of Mediterranean ports, including Haifa.
Each allegation requires vessel-level evidence. Complex ownership structures make it easy to convert a commercial connection into a misleading political accusation.
The brief Washington meeting may therefore represent a cautious reset rather than a strategic alliance.
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar separately invited his Ukrainian counterpart to visit Israel and said both countries discussed the Iranian threat.
That is a meaningful diplomatic signal.
It does not mean Israel will suddenly provide weapons or join Ukrainian covert operations. Nor does it mean Ukraine will subordinate its relationships in Libya, Sudan or elsewhere to Israeli preferences.
Both leaders also compete for American military resources.
Ukraine urgently needs Patriot interceptors. Israel and U.S. forces consume air-defence missiles in the Iran conflict. Cooperation against a shared supplier can coexist with competition for the same limited stockpiles.
Graham’s funeral created a rare setting where the leaders could speak without the political pressure of a formal summit.
The symbolic value may exceed the practical result.
Netanyahu can show Israeli voters that he remains connected to global leaders. Zelensky can demonstrate that Ukraine is not isolated from Middle Eastern security discussions.
The open question is whether Iran and Russia’s growing partnership will finally push Israel and Ukraine into deeper cooperation—or whether old distrust, competing regional interests and Netanyahu’s relationship with Putin will keep the handshake from becoming policy.