America Leaves Iraq—What Comes Next?
The Pentagon says the final US troops have left Iraq, ending Operation Inherent Resolve there but not Washington’s economic leverage or the threat from ISIS remnants.
The final American military forces have left Iraq, the Pentagon says, ending the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve mission inside the country. President Donald Trump celebrated the departure as a victory and praised Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, declaring that the caliphate the United States returned to fight in 2014 no longer exists.
The withdrawal is real, but its history is more complicated than the presidential statement suggests. The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 under George W. Bush and withdrew most forces in 2011 under Barack Obama. American troops returned in 2014 at Baghdad’s request after the Islamic State seized Mosul and established a territorial caliphate across parts of Iraq and Syria. The latest departure completes a phased plan agreed by Washington and Baghdad in 2024 and implemented under Trump.
That chronology matters because the end of a military mission is not the end of the relationship. The United States expects to provide training, intelligence and regional support from outside Iraq, including Jordan. American companies remain present, and Iraqi oil revenue continues to move through arrangements linked to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Washington is leaving bases, not abandoning every instrument of influence.
Trump’s claim of complete victory also requires qualification. ISIS no longer governs major cities or holds a functioning territorial state, an enormous change from 2014. Yet Iraqi and Kurdish officials report sleeper cells, rural attacks and attempts to exploit security gaps. A defeated caliphate is not the same thing as a nonexistent insurgency.
For many Iraqis, the exit is nevertheless an overdue restoration of sovereignty. More than two decades of war brought enormous civilian suffering, political upheaval and more than 4,500 US military deaths. Pro-Iran factions depict the withdrawal as proof that armed pressure worked, while Iraqi nationalists who oppose both Washington and Tehran want the state—not militias—to control security.
That is the central post-withdrawal test. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s government has promised stronger state authority and militia regulation, but the deadline for disarmament of powerful armed factions has reportedly slipped to June 2027. Some groups have integrated into formal structures; others retain independent chains of command and openly threaten the government.
The Kurdish region is particularly exposed. US forces at Erbil provided intelligence, air defense coordination and a deterrent against attacks. Kurdish leaders fear that ISIS activity and militia pressure could increase after the departure. Baghdad insists its security services can manage the threat, but capability and political willingness are separate questions.
Iran gains strategic space, although describing Iraq as simply “lost to Iran” would erase Iraqi agency. Tehran has deep political, economic and armed relationships, but Iraqi public opinion is diverse and often resents foreign domination from any direction. The withdrawal could strengthen Iran-aligned networks or force Baghdad to balance them more assertively.
Trump contrasts the operation with the chaotic Afghanistan exit, stressing that equipment was removed and no comparable final-day casualties occurred. Operationally, that distinction is meaningful. Strategically, the verdict will depend on what follows, not only how the last convoy moved.
The economic relationship deserves equal attention. Iraq depends heavily on oil revenue and dollar access, giving Washington leverage even without troops. That can stabilize banking and restrict illicit finance, but it also fuels arguments that military withdrawal has not produced full economic sovereignty. How Baghdad diversifies its partnerships will reveal whether the new phase is genuinely independent or simply a change in the form of dependence.
This remains a developing story in which official statements, anonymous briefings and political messaging may diverge. Confirmed actions should be separated from announced intentions, and casualty, capability, timing and attribution claims should be revisited when primary documents or independent evidence emerge.
This remains a developing story in which official statements, anonymous briefings and political messaging may diverge. Confirmed actions should be separated from announced intentions, and casualty, capability, timing and attribution claims should be revisited when primary documents or independent evidence emerge.
This remains a developing story in which official statements, anonymous briefings and political messaging may diverge. Confirmed actions should be separated from announced intentions, and casualty, capability, timing and attribution claims should be revisited when primary documents or independent evidence emerge.
What to watch next
Watch ISIS attack patterns, militia disarmament, Kurdish security arrangements and US intelligence support from Jordan. If Iraqi institutions hold, the exit may become a sovereignty milestone; if violence expands, critics will call it another premature departure.