Houthis Dig In at Bab el-Mandeb: Are Trenches and Tunnels Turning Murad Into a Fortress?
The Giants Brigades says Ansarallah is building trenches, tunnels and fortifications around Murad near Bab el-Mandeb. The claim is not yet independently verified, but rapid entrenchment would make any counteroffensive far more costly.
Yemen's Giants Brigades says Ansarallah has begun building fortifications, trenches and tunnels around Murad near the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. If verified, the work would signal that the Houthi movement is not treating its rapid coastal advance as a temporary raid. It would be preparing to absorb airstrikes and resist a counteroffensive at one of the world's most important shipping chokepoints.
The claim comes from a force aligned with the Presidential Leadership Council, which is fighting Ansarallah. No comprehensive satellite analysis or independent ground inspection had confirmed the scale of construction at drafting time. The correct formulation is therefore that the Giants Brigades alleges fortification—not that a complete tunnel complex has been proven.
The broader geography is not in serious doubt. Houthi forces have advanced along Yemen's Red Sea coast, taking Mocha, Perim Island and positions around the Bab el-Mandeb approach according to multiple international reports. Murad, on the coastal side of the strait, offers access to roads and observation points connecting the new front.
Trenches are cheap, fast and effective. They protect infantry from artillery fragments and drone observation, channel vehicles and link firing positions. Revetments can hide launchers or ammunition. Even shallow earthworks force an attacker to spend time identifying which positions are occupied.
Tunnels are more demanding. They require labor, ventilation, engineering and stable ground, but Ansarallah has years of experience building concealed storage and command positions. A tunnel system can protect leaders, missiles and supplies from aircraft. It can also allow fighters to survive bombardment and reappear after an attacking force believes the area is cleared.
The word “tunnel” is often used loosely in wartime reporting. It may refer to short covered trenches, natural caves, reinforced bunkers or extensive underground networks. Satellite images can reveal spoil piles, entrances and construction tracks, but cannot always show internal length or purpose. Claims should specify which type of structure is observed.
For Saudi Arabia and PLC forces, time matters. A counterattack against mobile units immediately after an advance differs from an assault on prepared defenses weeks later. Every day allows mines to be laid, roads registered for fire and supply caches dispersed. The public claim may be intended to create urgency for air support and reinforcements.
Ansarallah also benefits from broadcasting permanence. Shipping companies, insurers and foreign governments may alter decisions if they believe the group can hold territory overlooking Bab el-Mandeb. The psychological value of fortification can arrive before construction is complete.
Control of coastline does not equal total control of the strait. International naval forces remain present, the western shore belongs to Djibouti and Eritrea, and ships can transit a defined channel. But land-based missiles, drones, mines and observation can raise risk enough to change traffic. A force does not need to stop every vessel to impose major economic costs.
Airpower alone may not remove entrenched units. Saudi-led campaigns since 2015 showed that strikes can destroy facilities without resolving the political and ground-war structure. Civilian proximity, uncertain intelligence and decoys complicate targeting. A ground offensive, however, would produce casualties and could unite factions that are otherwise divided.
The PLC's cohesion is a central vulnerability. West-coast forces contain units with different patrons, commanders and political goals. The Giants Brigades, Tareq Saleh-aligned forces, Homeland Shield units and southern formations do not automatically operate as one army. Fortifications are physical; command unity is organizational. The second may be harder to build.
Civilian communities around the new line face another danger. Excavation near homes and roads can invite airstrikes, while military tunneling may damage land or restrict movement. Neither side should use inhabited areas to shield weapons, and attackers remain responsible for verifying targets and weighing civilian harm. Strategic geography does not make local people expendable.
Verification should be possible. High-resolution commercial imagery can compare the area before and after the reported capture. Analysts should look for linear earthworks, fresh excavation, berms, access roads and repeated vehicle activity. Geolocated videos from both sides can confirm positions, though propaganda channels may reuse old footage.
What to watch next
Watch satellite imagery of Murad, engineering convoys, new defensive belts and whether Ansarallah moves anti-ship weapons into the area. Do PLC forces mount a rapid counterattack or consolidate farther south? Will Saudi aircraft target construction sites? If the trenches and tunnels are real, are they a sign of confident permanent control—or evidence that Ansarallah expects a much larger battle to begin?