Iran Says It Controls Hormuz—But Is the Oman Deal a Reopening Plan or a New System of Iranian Permission?
Tehran says it has full control of the Strait of Hormuz and could reopen it if Washington honors a June memorandum. The United States says no talks are scheduled, while Oman’s proposed corridor remains unsettled.
Iran’s declaration that it has “full control” of the Strait of Hormuz sounds definitive. The waterway itself tells a messier story. Commercial traffic is moving at only a fraction of normal levels, Iran claims authority to approve passage, the United States says the channel is open, and Oman is trying to construct a temporary route between incompatible versions of sovereignty.
The IRGC Navy’s statement is an official Iranian claim, not an internationally accepted legal conclusion. Iran controls its territorial waters on the northern side of the strait, while Oman controls waters on the southern side. Transit passage through an international strait is protected under the law of the sea. Military power can obstruct that right in practice without converting a shared international chokepoint into one state’s property.
Tehran nevertheless possesses substantial coercive control. Mines, anti-ship missiles, drones, fast boats and coastal surveillance can make passage unsafe or expensive. Insurance, crew willingness and naval-escort availability matter as much as a map. When only a small share of ordinary tanker traffic attempts the crossing, Iran can argue that its restrictions are effective even while Washington says mines have been cleared.
Iranian officials say discussions with Oman produced an understanding under which traffic could resume if the United States fulfills promises in the June memorandum of understanding. The reported demands include ending attacks and the blockade, restoring sanctions relief and respecting agreed shipping arrangements. But Iranian and Omani descriptions have not always matched. Reuters reported that a senior Iranian source said the accord’s practical and revenue provisions were still being negotiated.
That distinction separates a diplomatic framework from an operational reopening. Who screens ships? Who guarantees that a vessel is not trading with Iran? Which navy responds to warning shots? Are fees maritime-service charges or Iranian tolls? What happens when Washington sanctions a cargo that Tehran approves? Until these questions have joint answers, an announced “agreement” may be leverage rather than a functioning corridor.
President Masoud Pezeshkian’s message that Iran is ready to work with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other regional states is strategically significant. Gulf governments want predictable energy exports and fear becoming battlefields in a U.S.-Iran confrontation. Iran wants its neighbors to reject American isolation efforts. Cooperation is therefore possible, but it competes with deep distrust and with Gulf investment in pipelines and ports that bypass Hormuz.
The White House position further complicates the picture. President Donald Trump said there were no talks or conversations with Iran ongoing or scheduled. That can coexist with indirect mediation: Oman, Qatar or Pakistan may carry messages without a formal U.S.-Iran negotiating session. It can also be bargaining language intended to force Tehran to approach on new terms rather than revive the expired June arrangement.
Tehran interprets the MoU as a binding political commitment whose promises Washington violated. Washington argues that renewed Iranian actions and disagreements over the strait invalidated the old bargain. Both can then claim the other side must move first. Iran conditions reopening on U.S. performance; the United States conditions relief on Iranian compliance. Shipping companies pay for the circularity.
The “full control” claim should therefore be understood as three claims bundled together: Iran has the capability to disrupt traffic, says it has the political right to regulate it and wants recognition of that role in any settlement. The first is visibly credible. The second is disputed under international law. The third is the object of the diplomacy.
Oil markets can misread political language in both directions. A press release announcing reopening may lower prices before a single fully insured tanker crosses; a warning from the IRGC can raise them even if physical exports continue through alternative terminals. Vessel-tracking data also have limits because ships may disable or manipulate transponders during war. The most reliable picture combines AIS records, satellite imagery, port loading data and insurer notices. That is why a corridor should be judged over several days of sustained two-way traffic rather than one escorted passage.
Regional states face a difficult choice. Joining an Iran-approved system might restore cargo movement but normalize coercion. Refusing it might preserve a legal principle while extending shortages and economic damage. A temporary corridor could be a bridge to negotiations—or an informal partition of authority that creates the next confrontation.
What to watch next
Watch actual vessel counts rather than declarations, written statements from Muscat, escort arrangements, insurance rates and whether Washington issues sanctions waivers. If traffic rises without a direct U.S.-Iran meeting, mediation may be working quietly. If Iran insists every ship needs its approval, is that a safety mechanism during war—or the precedent for permanent control it has long sought?