Iranian MP Warns Gulf States: Are U.S. Bases Turning Arab Infrastructure Into the Next Target?
A reported warning from an Iranian parliamentarian has revived a frightening scenario: if U.S. pressure on Iran expands, could Gulf infrastructure become part of the battlefield?
A reported warning from Iranian parliamentarian Ali Khezrian, a member of Iran’s National Security Commission, has pushed one of the most dangerous questions of the Iran war back into the open: if the United States attacks Iran from or through Gulf territory, will Tehran target the infrastructure of Arab states?
The statement circulating through regional monitoring channels is stark. Khezrian reportedly warned that people from Arab countries should leave and that Iran would not only attack U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf but could also target infrastructure in those countries. Because this specific quote has not been uniformly reported across major wire services, it should be treated carefully. But even as a reported threat, it matters because it reflects a strategic idea Iran has signaled before: Gulf states cannot host or enable attacks on Iran without facing consequences.
This is the nightmare scenario for the Gulf. For decades, several Arab states have relied on U.S. military protection while also trying to avoid becoming direct battlefields in U.S.-Iran confrontations. They host bases, logistics hubs, air defense systems, ports, and intelligence infrastructure. At the same time, they trade with Iran, manage migrant populations, and attempt diplomatic balancing. The Iran war makes that balancing act much harder.
From Tehran’s perspective, the logic is deterrence. If U.S. aircraft, ships, drones, or command systems use Gulf territory to strike Iran, then Iran wants those governments to fear the cost. A threat to energy facilities, ports, airports, desalination plants, bridges, logistics zones, or financial centers is not only military signaling. It is a way of telling Gulf monarchies: your prosperity depends on staying out.
From the Gulf perspective, this is coercion. Arab governments may argue that Iran is trying to impose veto power over their sovereign defense relationships. They face real threats from Iranian missiles, drones, and regional proxies. They remember attacks on oil infrastructure and shipping. They also know that if the Strait of Hormuz remains restricted and U.S.-Iran confrontation deepens, their economic models could suffer even without direct strikes.
The most destabilizing part is the blurred line between military and civilian infrastructure. A port can be commercial and strategic. An airport can serve passengers and military logistics. A refinery can be an economic asset and a state-security target. A data center can support civilian finance and defense communications. Modern economies are full of dual-use nodes. That creates enormous danger because each side can justify attacks by claiming the target had military relevance.
The United States may see Gulf bases as essential for deterrence and blockade enforcement. Iran may see them as launchpads. Gulf governments may see them as insurance policies. Their citizens may see them as magnets for retaliation. All four views can be true at the same time.
This is why Hegseth’s pressure on allies over Hormuz is politically explosive. Washington says Europe and Asia should help more because they depend heavily on Gulf energy flows. But many Gulf states may quietly fear being dragged into a war whose strategic decisions are made elsewhere. If Arab infrastructure is attacked, will Washington guarantee total protection? If U.S. bases are targeted, will Gulf governments have the power to restrain escalation? If oil facilities burn, who pays the economic price?
Israel’s role complicates the calculus. Iran may view U.S., Israeli, and Gulf cooperation as one system, even when Gulf governments publicly distance themselves from Israeli operations. Some Arab states have developed quiet security or intelligence channels with Israel because they fear Iran. But open association with Israeli military pressure is domestically sensitive, especially during wars involving Gaza, Lebanon, or Iran. Tehran understands this and may exploit it rhetorically.
There is also a regional public opinion issue. If Iran threatens Arab infrastructure, many Arabs will see it as proof that Tehran treats their countries as expendable. If the United States uses Arab territory for operations that trigger retaliation, others will accuse Gulf rulers of inviting danger. If Israel benefits strategically from Gulf-U.S. coordination, critics will frame the Gulf as complicit. Governments must navigate all these narratives while protecting physical infrastructure.
Could Iran actually carry out such threats? It has missiles and drones capable of reaching targets across the Gulf. It also has experience with asymmetric pressure through maritime incidents and allied groups. But attacking Gulf infrastructure at scale would be risky. It could unify Arab states against Tehran, invite deeper U.S. strikes, damage global sympathy, and potentially threaten China’s energy interests. Iran would likely weigh escalation carefully.
Still, wars are not always controlled by perfect calculation. A misread radar track, a missile interception failure, a strike on a base causing mass casualties, or a proxy attack exceeding orders could force decisions quickly. Infrastructure wars can escalate faster than political leaders expect because economic panic spreads instantly.
The reported Khezrian warning should therefore be read less as a prediction and more as a signal. Iran wants Gulf capitals to fear the consequences of alignment. The United States wants them to support pressure on Tehran. Israel wants the regional order reshaped against Iran. Gulf states want security without becoming the battlefield.
The open question is whether that balance can survive a prolonged blockade. If Hormuz remains restricted, U.S. carriers stay forward, and Iran sees diplomacy as coercion, the Gulf’s glittering airports, ports, refineries, and cities may become the silent hostages of a war everyone claims they are trying to contain.