Pashinyan Wants the CSTO to Expel Armenia. Is Russia Losing a 200-Year Security Relationship?
Armenia’s prime minister says he would be happy if the Russia-led CSTO removed his country, ending the dilemma of formal withdrawal. The statement confirms a de facto rupture—but Armenia still needs a security model that can survive its geography.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has moved his country’s break with the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization from diplomatic freeze to almost open invitation.
If the alliance wants to expel Armenia, he said, he would be “very happy.” It would free Yerevan from the dilemma of deciding whether to withdraw.
The remark came during parliamentary debate on the government’s 2026-2031 program. Pashinyan said Armenia had no plan to resume active participation in the CSTO over the next five years and that the organization had failed to answer Yerevan’s security questions. Armenia stopped taking part in CSTO activity in early 2024 and ceased normal financial participation, while remaining formally listed as a member.
The statement is dramatic because Armenia’s modern security system was built around Russia. Russian forces guarded borders, Moscow supplied weapons, and generations of Armenian leaders treated the relationship as protection against regional isolation and conflict with Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Pashinyan now argues that events from 2020 through 2023 demonstrated Russia’s limitations as guarantor.
The grievance is understandable but legally complicated. During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, most fighting occurred in territory internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, even though ethnic Armenians controlled it for decades. Russia and other CSTO members could argue that the alliance’s collective-defense obligation did not cover the disputed region.
The 2021 and 2022 border clashes created a stronger Armenian case because Yerevan said Azerbaijani forces entered sovereign Armenian territory and formally requested assistance. The CSTO sent an assessment mission and proposed monitoring but did not provide the military intervention Armenia sought. For many Armenians, the distinction between procedural response and actual defense became proof that the guarantee was hollow.
Moscow offers a different account. Russian officials say Pashinyan’s recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory altered the situation, that Russia faced its own security demands in Ukraine, and that Western engagement encouraged Yerevan to distance itself. They also warn that leaving the CSTO will not change Armenia’s geography.
That last point is strategically important even if used self-servingly. Armenia is landlocked, shares closed or difficult borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, depends heavily on trade routes through Georgia and Iran, and hosts Russian military infrastructure. Replacing Moscow is not as simple as signing a new statement with Brussels or Washington.
Pashinyan is therefore pursuing diversification: closer ties with the European Union, security cooperation with France, engagement with the United States, arms purchases from India and a peace process with Azerbaijan. The goal appears to be reducing dependence on one unreliable guarantor rather than immediately joining another military bloc.
Critics inside Armenia see danger. They argue that Pashinyan is dismantling an imperfect shield before alternatives can deter Azerbaijan. Supporters answer that a guarantee which repeatedly fails may create false confidence and give Moscow leverage without providing protection. Both positions confront real risks.
Belarus deepened the rupture. Pashinyan accused President Alexander Lukashenko and Belarus—a fellow CSTO member—of supporting Azerbaijan. Minsk rejected hostile interpretations, but the episode reinforced Armenia’s question: what is the meaning of an alliance if one member helps the state another member fears?
The CSTO’s collective-defense language resembles NATO’s Article 5 in political effect, but institutions are more than clauses. NATO has integrated command, exercises, planning and a powerful U.S. military core. The CSTO’s response depends heavily on Russian willingness and capacity. Armenia’s experience suggests that legal wording could not overcome divergent member interests.
Why might Pashinyan prefer expulsion to withdrawal? Domestically, expulsion lets him say Armenia did not abandon an alliance; the alliance formally acknowledged a relationship already dead. It could reduce political blame and avoid a prolonged legal process. For the CSTO, however, expelling a founding member advertises institutional failure and may encourage others to test their own options.
Russia could keep Armenia in limbo instead. Formal membership without participation preserves a symbolic claim and avoids setting a precedent. Pashinyan’s public invitation may be designed to make that ambiguity politically costly.
The peace track with Azerbaijan will determine whether his strategy looks visionary or reckless. A durable border agreement, open transport links and normalized relations with Turkey would reduce Armenia’s need for an external military patron. Renewed clashes would expose the gap between old guarantees and new partnerships.
So is Russia losing a two-century relationship? It has already lost much of the trust that made the relationship valuable. Yet economic, cultural, military and family links cannot be removed by one CSTO decision.
The unanswered question is what comes after the symbolic divorce. Can Armenia build security through diplomacy and multiple partners before another crisis tests it? Or will escape from a failed guarantee reveal that no outside power is prepared to offer a stronger one?
### What to watch next
CSTO legal steps, Russian base negotiations, Armenian procurement and progress in the Azerbaijan peace process will determine whether de facto separation becomes formal. The decisive measure is not which bloc Armenia leaves but what deters the next border crisis.