Russia Threatens to Restart Nuclear Tests
Moscow says it will respond in kind if the United States resumes full-scale nuclear testing. What would that mean for the global test moratorium?
Russia says it will respond if the United States resumes full-scale nuclear testing, raising the prospect that a decades-old global taboo could collapse through reciprocal escalation.
The key phrase is “full-scale.” Nuclear-capable missile tests, computer simulations and subcritical experiments do not produce a self-sustaining nuclear explosion and are not the same as detonating a warhead underground.
The United States last conducted a nuclear explosive test in 1992. The Soviet Union’s last test was in 1990. Both countries continue extensive laboratory and delivery-system programs intended to maintain arsenals without explosive testing.
Russia revoked its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2023, arguing that this aligned its legal position with the United States, which signed but never ratified the treaty. Moscow says it still observes a moratorium unless Washington tests first.
That conditional posture creates a dangerous mirror. Each side can prepare facilities and claim it is merely responding to the other’s readiness. Preparations then become intelligence indicators that justify further preparation.
Supporters of renewed testing argue that aging warhead designs, new systems and uncertainties require physical proof. They say simulations cannot answer every question and that rivals may already conduct hidden low-yield experiments.
Opponents argue that major nuclear powers possess enough data to maintain weapons without detonations. Testing would produce environmental harm, accelerate new designs and encourage China, India, Pakistan or North Korea to expand their own programs.
Verification is stronger than many people assume. International seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide networks can detect suspicious events across the globe. Very small or carefully contained tests remain harder to characterize, but a full-scale explosion would be difficult to hide.
The political consequences could be larger than the technical value. A U.S. test would allow Moscow to portray its response as forced. A Russian test would generate pressure in Washington to demonstrate reliability and strength. China would face similar demands from military planners.
Arms control is already weakened by suspended treaties, mistrust and modernization. The testing moratorium is one of the few remaining restraints shared by most nuclear powers. Once broken, restoring it would require negotiations under worse conditions.
Moscow’s warning may be deterrence rather than intent. Publicly promising reciprocity is designed to discourage Washington from crossing the threshold. But deterrent statements can become commitments leaders feel unable to abandon without appearing weak.
Testing would reshape more than arsenals
Communities near historic test sites still carry health and environmental legacies. Any decision to resume explosions would affect Indigenous and local populations before it changes strategic balances.
At Nevada, political and legal resistance would be significant. At Novaya Zemlya, secrecy and restricted access would make independent environmental monitoring difficult. Preparations themselves could generate public fear.
The first mover may gain technical data but lose diplomatic ground. Non-nuclear states accepted unequal obligations partly because nuclear powers promised restraint and disarmament efforts. Renewed testing would weaken that bargain.
It could also complicate nonproliferation negotiations with Iran and North Korea. Washington and Moscow would struggle to argue that others must limit programs while they reopen test tunnels.
Confidence-building options remain available: invite observers to test sites, exchange notifications about subcritical experiments and strengthen CTBTO access. These steps would not solve rivalry but could reduce misinterpretation.
The moratorium has survived without the treaty entering into force. That political achievement is fragile precisely because it depends on reciprocal restraint rather than a fully binding system.
Technical verification would be essential if either side announces a test. Seismic networks can identify a large underground explosion, but very low-yield experiments may invite argument over whether the political threshold was crossed. Public accusations could arrive before the CTBTO completes analysis. Washington and Moscow therefore need a private notification channel even while relations deteriorate. Otherwise a conventional mining blast, an earthquake or a subcritical experiment could become part of an escalation spiral. The most stabilizing immediate commitment would be simple: no explosive nuclear testing without advance notice, accompanied by access for international sensors and a public explanation of the event.
What to watch next
Are facilities at Nevada or Novaya Zemlya visibly prepared for an explosive test? Do officials clarify whether subcritical experiments would trigger a response? The warning is real, but the threshold must remain precise to prevent routine activity from being misread as the end of the moratorium.