Geopolitics ·

Xi, Putin, Modi and Pezeshkian in One SCO ‘Family Photo’: Birth of a New World Order—or Optics Hiding Deep Rivalries?

The SCO summit photograph puts China, Russia, India, Iran, Pakistan and Central Asian leaders together. It projects multipolar power, but the group is not a unified military bloc.

Xi, Putin, Modi and Pezeshkian in One SCO ‘Family Photo’: Birth of a New World Order—or Optics Hiding Deep Rivalries?

The SCO summit’s family photograph is designed to become an argument. Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, Narendra Modi, Masoud Pezeshkian, Shehbaz Sharif, Alexander Lukashenko and the leaders of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan stood together as Western governments confronted war fatigue, Iran escalation and economic uncertainty.

For supporters of a multipolar order, the image shows that U.S. pressure no longer isolates its targets. Russia and Iran appear beside two of the world’s largest economies. China hosts a diplomatic platform beyond Western control. Central Asian governments exercise options rather than accept one patron.

For skeptics, it is a photograph of states whose interests frequently collide. India and Pakistan are nuclear-armed rivals. India competes with China along a disputed border and builds security ties with the United States, Japan and Australia. Central Asian states welcome Russian and Chinese investment but worry about domination.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation began as a security forum focused on borders, separatism and extremism. It has expanded into a large Eurasian platform covering diplomacy, trade, transport and defense contacts. Expansion increases prestige but makes consensus harder.

Russia wants proof that sanctions have not turned it into an international outcast and seeks partners for energy, Arctic and logistics projects. China wants stable continental routes and institutions that reflect its growing influence. Iran wants markets, political legitimacy and support against U.S. economic and military pressure.

India’s purpose is different. New Delhi values Russian energy and weapons ties, needs access to Central Asia and refuses to let China define Asian institutions alone. Participating in the SCO does not mean joining an anti-American alliance; it is part of India’s preference for strategic autonomy.

Pakistan gains proximity to China, Russia, Iran and Central Asia while promoting the new Mecca defense agreement with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. That web of relationships shows why twenty-first-century alignment is not a clean division into two Cold War camps.

President Pezeshkian used the summit to say Iran would reciprocate if Washington honored the June memorandum. The setting strengthens Tehran’s claim that it has alternatives, yet China and India also depend on stable energy flows through Hormuz. They may sympathize with Iran’s opposition to sanctions while opposing prolonged shipping disruption.

Putin met Xi and Modi separately. Bilateral meetings often produce more substance than the plenary declaration because leaders can negotiate energy, payments, visas and weapons away from the requirement for group consensus. The family photo is the cover; the side rooms are the book.

Does the SCO threaten NATO? It lacks NATO’s integrated command, binding collective-defense structure and standardized force planning. Some members have opposing security partnerships. Describing it as an ‘Eastern NATO’ may exaggerate military unity while overlooking its economic and political influence.

The summit still matters. Institutions shape habits. Repeated meetings create payment channels, transport corridors, intelligence contacts and diplomatic language that can reduce dependence on Western systems. Coordination does not need to become an alliance to constrain U.S. leverage.

Western policy also helps determine the organization’s appeal. Broad sanctions can push targeted states toward alternative networks, while demands that middle powers choose one camp may encourage them to build forums where they do not have to choose. That does not mean every SCO initiative succeeds.

The photograph’s most important message may be emotional: none of these leaders wants a world in which legitimacy is granted only by Washington or Brussels. Whether they can create a fairer order—or merely protect each other from accountability—is a separate question.

Economic weight also varies sharply. China dominates the group’s trade capacity, while several members depend on Chinese credit or Russian security links. Multipolar rhetoric can conceal an internal hierarchy. Smaller members will judge the SCO by whether it protects their bargaining space or simply replaces Western pressure with expectations from Beijing and Moscow.

The Ukraine and Iran wars provide immediate tests. India may reject pressure to endorse Russia’s battlefield narrative, while Gulf shipping disruption harms every importer. A common declaration can paper over those differences for a day; sanctions decisions, oil purchases and votes at the United Nations reveal the real alignment.

What to watch next

Watch summit communiqués on Ukraine and Iran, bilateral energy deals, local-currency payment systems and concrete transport projects. The test is not how many flags fit in one image. It is whether countries with deep rivalries can implement shared policy after the cameras leave.