Pakistani Armoured Vehicles and Turkish-Pakistani Drones Appear in Khartoum: Is Sudan’s Army Building a New Foreign Arsenal?
Footage from Khartoum appears to show Pakistani-made Mohafiz-V armoured vehicles, while YIHA-III loitering munitions have been documented in Sudan’s war. The imagery supports reports of expanding foreign military supply, but the exact contract, quantities and delivery chain remain opaque.
Footage circulating from Khartoum appears to show a convoy of Pakistani-made Mohafiz-V armoured vehicles, potentially supporting reports of a military-supply agreement between Sudan and Pakistan.
Separate imagery and defence analysis have identified Turkish-Pakistani YIHA-III one-way attack drones in Sudan’s conflict.
The YIHA-III presence has stronger open-source support.
Defence analysts reported visual evidence of the loitering munition in Sudan earlier in 2026, including wreckage associated with fighting in North Kordofan.
Sudan’s Armed Forces have expanded their drone inventory as they fight the Rapid Support Forces.
Reports also identify Iranian Mohajer and Ababil drones, Turkish Bayraktar systems and other foreign platforms in the conflict.
The Mohafiz-V vehicle identification is more dependent on the quality and provenance of the latest footage.
Armoured vehicles can be misidentified from short videos because several models share similar hulls, turrets, windows and camouflage.
Reliable confirmation would require clear manufacturer features, serial markings, transport documents or acknowledgment from Sudanese or Pakistani authorities.
If the identification is correct, the convoy would suggest that the relationship extends beyond drones to protected mobility for troops and security units.
Armoured vehicles are valuable in urban and semi-urban fighting.
They can transport personnel through small-arms fire, patrol contested neighbourhoods, escort convoys and support raids.
They do not provide immunity from heavy weapons, mines or modern drones.
The reported military package would fit Sudan’s changing battlefield.
The army regained significant territory, including Khartoum, but fighting shifted toward Kordofan, Darfur and other regions.
Both sides increasingly rely on long-range drones because Sudan is enormous and ground forces are stretched.
Drones can strike fuel depots, markets, command sites and infrastructure hundreds of kilometres from the front.
Civilians pay a severe price.
UNICEF reported children killed and injured in a July drone attack on a market in North Kordofan. International organisations have warned that drone warfare is expanding the geographic reach of violence.
The supplier question therefore carries legal and ethical responsibility.
Pakistan and Turkey may argue that Sudan’s internationally recognised armed forces have the right to purchase defence equipment.
Critics will ask whether suppliers can ensure the weapons are used lawfully and whether monitoring exists after delivery.
The Rapid Support Forces have also obtained sophisticated foreign equipment, including long-endurance drones linked by analysts to external sponsors.
Sudan has become a competitive arms market in which regional states support preferred factions.
The YIHA-III is described as a loitering munition, meaning it can search or remain airborne before diving into a target.
Such weapons are cheaper than crewed aircraft and can be deployed rapidly.
They can also increase civilian harm when targeting intelligence is weak or operators strike locations inside populated areas.
The term “Turkish-Pakistani made” requires precision.
A system may involve design, components, production or corporate partnerships across both countries. Public reporting should identify the manufacturer and supply chain where evidence exists rather than assigning national ownership through online labels alone.
The same applies to the Mohafiz-V.
A vehicle associated with Pakistan could be produced under licence, exported through an intermediary or delivered as part of a wider agreement.
The reported package may include training, maintenance, ammunition and communications equipment in addition to visible platforms.
That support often matters more than the initial delivery.
A drone without trained operators, spare parts and secure communications may have limited value.
Foreign advisers or contractors may therefore accompany weapons sales even when governments deny direct involvement.
The appearance of new systems in Khartoum also carries a political message.
The Sudanese army can present itself as rebuilding a professional national force with international partners.
The RSF and its supporters will describe the deliveries as foreign escalation.
Neither narrative addresses the need for a political settlement.
Additional drones and vehicles may shift local battles without ending the war. Comparable external support to both sides can prolong conflict by preventing decisive defeat.
Independent arms monitoring is extremely difficult while borders, airports and ports remain contested.
Satellite imagery, wreckage and convoy videos become essential but incomplete evidence.
The strongest current conclusion is that YIHA-III munitions have appeared in Sudan and footage may show Mohafiz-V vehicles in Khartoum.
The exact size and terms of a Pakistan–Sudan military deal remain unconfirmed in public documentation.
The open question is whether the new arsenal will strengthen the army enough to impose control—or deepen Sudan’s transformation into a testing ground where foreign weapons become more advanced while civilian protection becomes weaker.