America Has Used ‘Virtually All’ of Its Long-Range Army Missiles in the Iran War: What Happens if China Moves Next?
Reuters reports that the U.S. Army has consumed virtually all of its ATACMS and Precision Strike Missile inventory during the Iran war. Combined with heavy use of Patriot, THAAD and Tomahawk weapons, the depletion exposes a serious readiness problem for Ukraine and any future conflict with China or Russia.
The United States Army has used “virtually all” of its stockpile of ATACMS and Precision Strike Missiles during the war with Iran, according to Reuters sources familiar with the inventory. The disclosure goes beyond earlier warnings about interceptor shortages. ATACMS and the newer PrSM are offensive long-range precision weapons designed to strike air-defence sites, missile units, command centres and other targets from a safe distance. They allow the United States to attack without immediately exposing pilots to the most dangerous parts of Iranian airspace. That advantage has been purchased by consuming an arsenal that took years to build.
Reuters reports that the Army has used virtually all available weapons in these categories. The newer Precision Strike Missile is still entering production and was never stockpiled in the numbers of older systems. ATACMS is being phased out. This creates a transition problem: the old missile has been heavily consumed while its replacement is not yet available at sufficient scale.
The wider picture is equally concerning. Reporting and independent analysis indicate that the United States has used roughly two-thirds of parts of its Patriot interceptor inventory, more than a third of its THAAD stock, large numbers of Tomahawks and other high-end munitions. Exact inventories are classified, so all public figures are estimates or source-based disclosures. The trend is not in dispute. Consumption is occurring faster than production.
This matters because modern military strategy assumes the United States may need to fight in several theatres. Ukraine relies on American long-range weapons and air defence. Gulf allies and Israel require interceptors against Iranian missiles and drones. American planners must also maintain reserves for Korea and, above all, a potential conflict with China in the Western Pacific.
A war over Taiwan would require enormous numbers of long-range precision weapons. Chinese air defences, missile launchers, ports, ships and command networks are dispersed over a vast area. U.S. aircraft and ships would need to attack from outside heavily defended zones. That is exactly the mission for which long-range missiles are most valuable. Using them in Iran today reduces options in the Pacific tomorrow.
President Donald Trump says the United States has plenty of ammunition and is expanding production rapidly. The Pentagon is indeed increasing orders and working with contractors to accelerate output. Industrial expansion cannot happen instantly. Missile production depends on rocket motors, seekers, explosives, guidance electronics and specialised labour. Some suppliers produce only a small number of components each year.
The Iran war has exposed a structural weakness in the Western defence industrial base. For decades, the United States assumed conflicts would be relatively short or that precision weapons would be used selectively. Ukraine already challenged that assumption. Iran has now demonstrated that sustained high-intensity missile warfare consumes expensive weapons at a rate that wealthy countries struggle to replace.
The cost exchange can be unfavourable. A relatively cheap Iranian drone may force the launch of a much more expensive interceptor. A mobile missile launcher may require multiple reconnaissance assets and several long-range weapons to destroy. Iran does not need to match American technology dollar for dollar. It needs to make the United States spend faster than factories can replenish.
There is also a strategic question about target selection. If scarce PrSM and ATACMS weapons were used against targets that could have been attacked by cheaper aircraft-delivered munitions, planners may have prioritised reducing pilot risk over preserving strategic reserves. That can be justified during a dangerous campaign. It still creates opportunity costs.
Ukraine may feel those costs directly. ATACMS supplied to Kyiv allowed strikes deep behind Russian lines. Future transfers become harder if the American inventory is nearly exhausted. The same applies to Patriot missiles. Every weapon retained for U.S. forces is one Ukraine cannot receive.
Congress will likely respond with larger defence appropriations. Money alone is insufficient without industrial capacity. The United States may need multiyear contracts, additional factories, new suppliers and strategic stockpile requirements based on sustained war rather than short campaigns.
The open question is whether the Iran war becomes the shock that finally rebuilds American munitions production—or whether Washington has discovered, at the worst possible moment, that the world’s most powerful military can run low on the weapons its strategy depends on.