Ethiopian Drones Hit Tigray Convoys Near Sheraro: Did TPLF ‘Army 70’ Return From Sudan Through Eritrea?
Drone strikes have targeted Tigrayan military movements near Sheraro as conflict again threatens northern Ethiopia. Reports say units known as Army 70 and Army 13 are active, but the claim that Army 70 travelled from Sudan through Eritrea remains unresolved and politically explosive.
Ethiopian drone strikes have again targeted military movements around Sheraro in northwestern Tigray as the region moves closer to renewed large-scale war.
Local reporting says convoys linked to Tigrayan forces were attacked in the countryside. Units identified in regional accounts as “Army 70” and “Army 13” are said to be participating in operations around Sheraro.
The exact organisation, strength and movement of these formations remain difficult to verify independently.
The most politically explosive question concerns Army 70.
Sudanese and Ethiopian media have previously described a Tigrayan formation using that name operating in or around eastern Sudan. Some accounts say its fighters participated alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces.
Footage circulated earlier in 2026 showing personnel identified as Army 70 in Sudan’s Gedaref region. The provenance and date of some clips have been disputed.
If the same force is now fighting in Sheraro, how did it move from Sudan back into Tigray?
Geography creates several possibilities.
Northwestern Tigray borders both Sudan and Eritrea. A unit could theoretically move directly from eastern Sudan toward the Tigray frontier, depending on territorial control and security conditions. It could also pass through Eritrean territory.
The Eritrea theory is especially controversial.
Eritrean forces fought alongside Ethiopia’s federal government against the TPLF during the 2020–2022 war. Eritrea and Tigrayan forces committed and suffered severe abuses during that conflict.
A later arrangement allowing Tigrayan fighters to transit Eritrea would represent a remarkable strategic shift.
Regional alliances have changed dramatically.
Sudan and Ethiopia accuse one another of supporting hostile armed groups. Sudan has accused Ethiopia of supporting or enabling RSF operations. Ethiopia accuses Sudan’s army of supporting Tigrayan fighters.
Eritrea has increasingly difficult relations with Addis Ababa and its own strategic interests along the border.
An enemy of yesterday can become a useful partner when regional balances change.
That does not prove Eritrea transported Army 70.
The logistical question should be investigated through geolocation, vehicle tracking, uniforms, commanders and dates.
A unit name can also be reused or applied inconsistently. “Army 70” may describe a formation or network whose personnel move independently rather than one intact army convoy travelling across borders.
Ethiopian drone activity near Sheraro is better supported.
Earlier strikes in the region targeted vehicles and suspected military movements around Tahtay Adiyabo. Local sources reported repeated drone passes and casualties among fighters, while access to strike areas was restricted.
Neither the federal government nor Tigrayan authorities has provided a complete public account.
The use of drones reflects military asymmetry.
Addis Ababa possesses systems capable of striking convoys without committing large ground formations. Tigrayan forces can disperse, conceal vehicles and operate close to borders where attribution and escalation become harder.
Civilian risk remains high.
Northwestern Tigray suffered enormous destruction during the previous war. A renewed conflict threatens communities still rebuilding farms, hospitals and schools.
The Pretoria peace agreement ended major fighting in 2022 but left unresolved questions about disarmament, territorial control and political administration. Recent TPLF moves to restore pre-war structures further weakened that agreement.
Sudan’s civil war now adds another layer.
If Tigrayan formations are genuinely fighting alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces and moving back into Ethiopia, the conflicts are becoming operationally connected.
If Ethiopia supports the RSF while Sudan supports Tigrayan forces, each side may be using the other’s internal enemies as proxies.
Eritrea could become the third axis.
The evidence is not sufficient to map every alliance confidently. That uncertainty is itself dangerous.
Governments can justify preventive strikes based on suspected cross-border movements that outsiders cannot verify.
The open question is whether Army 70’s appearance near Sheraro proves a Sudan–Tigray military corridor—and whether Eritrea facilitated it—or whether competing propaganda networks are turning fragmented Tigrayan formations into evidence of a regional conspiracy larger than the facts currently support.