Saudi Arabia’s Forgotten Wars: Did a Century of Conquest and Intervention Create Today’s Houthi Crisis?
From the first Saudi state and the 1934 Yemen war to the 2015 intervention, Riyadh’s security system was built through force as well as diplomacy. How much explains today’s crisis?
Saudi Arabia presents itself as the anchor of Arab stability: a rapidly modernizing kingdom investing in cities, technology and tourism under Vision 2030. Its critics answer with another history—one of conquest, hard borders, tribal warfare and repeated intervention in neighboring states.
That history is real, but often simplified for propaganda. Understanding it can explain why Saudi Arabia faces deep mistrust in Yemen and across the Gulf. It cannot turn every historical accusation into fact or make present-day attacks on civilians legitimate.
The first Saudi state emerged from the 1744 alliance between Muhammad bin Saud, ruler of Diriyah, and the religious reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Political expansion and a strict religious movement reinforced one another. Saudi-Wahhabi forces sacked Karbala in 1802 and captured Mecca soon afterward. They attacked the Najaf area, although the common claim that Najaf was successfully sacked in the same way is disputed.
Ottoman-Egyptian forces under Muhammad Ali’s dynasty destroyed that state in 1818. A second Saudi state rose and collapsed in the nineteenth century. Abdulaziz Ibn Saud then rebuilt power from Riyadh, defeated rivals and unified most of the territory proclaimed as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.
Yemen is the most relevant frontier. Saudi Arabia and the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen fought in 1934. The Treaty of Taif ended the war and recognized Saudi control of Asir, Jizan and Najran. Saying Riyadh simply “annexed” three settled Yemeni provinces in one act erases complicated earlier rule and contested loyalties, but Yemenis have long regarded the territorial loss as a foundational grievance.
In Kuwait, Ikhwan forces led by Faisal al-Dawish attacked at Jahra in 1920. Britain’s regional power helped preserve the sheikhdom. The 1922 Uqair conference then drew borders and neutral zones with little representation for some affected communities. It is fair to say modern frontiers were shaped by coercion; it is harder to prove every raid reflected a personal plan by Ibn Saud to absorb the whole state.
The Buraimi dispute shows a similar pattern. Saudi forces occupied positions in the oasis in 1952, facing claims by Oman and Abu Dhabi. British-backed forces expelled them in 1955. The 1974 Jeddah Agreement later settled much of the Saudi-UAE boundary, but its maps and implications around Khor al-Udaid remain contentious. Emirati critics say the settlement blocked a land connection with Qatar; Saudi accounts emphasize negotiated sovereignty.
Saudi Arabia and Qatar experienced an armed border clash at al-Khafus in 1992 and a much larger political confrontation when Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain and Egypt imposed a blockade in 2017. The blockade ended in 2021, but it reinforced the perception that Saudi diplomacy can begin with economic pressure.
Ikhwan raids also crossed toward Transjordan and Iraq in the 1920s, where British air power helped stop them. Saudi-Omani rivalry centered on Buraimi and influence among interior tribes. With Egypt, centuries-old memories of Muhammad Ali coexist with modern disputes, including the controversial 2016 transfer of Tiran and Sanafir islands to Saudi sovereignty.
These episodes do not make Saudi Arabia uniquely artificial or expansionist. Most modern states were formed through war, imperial boundaries and unequal treaties. Iran, Turkey, Britain and other regional powers have their own records of coercion. The relevant question is whether historical patterns continue to shape current policy.
The 2015 Saudi-led intervention in Yemen is the strongest case. Riyadh entered to restore the internationally recognized government after the Houthis seized Sana’a and advanced south. Saudi leaders feared an Iran-aligned armed movement on their border. The coalition’s air campaign, blockade practices and support for fragmented local forces contributed to mass civilian suffering and institutional collapse.
Did Saudi Arabia “create” the Houthis? Not literally. Ansarullah grew from a Zaydi revival movement, domestic exclusion, wars with Ali Abdullah Saleh’s government and its own leadership decisions. Iranian support expanded over time. Yet Saudi religious influence, border policy and military intervention helped create the grievances and battlefield conditions in which the movement consolidated power.
The Houthis also possess agency. They have repressed opponents, recruited children, attacked civilian shipping and launched weapons at population centers. Historical injury does not erase responsibility for those actions. Nor does Saudi modernization erase responsibility for its past intervention.
The most useful conclusion is neither “Saudi Arabia deserves everything that happens” nor “history is irrelevant.” Riyadh’s security doctrine repeatedly sought buffers, compliant neighbors and control over strategic routes. That approach sometimes produced the very resistance it was designed to suppress.
What to watch next
Can Mohammed bin Salman replace coercive buffer politics with negotiated regional security? Will Saudi Arabia acknowledge Yemeni grievances without accepting Houthi domination? Can borders and resource disputes be handled transparently rather than through pressure? And is today’s crisis the return of an old Saudi operating system—or the moment Riyadh finally chooses to rewrite it?